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Abstract 
Title Determinants of Corporate Liquidity in Sweden Listed 
Firms – The Importance of Lines of Credit 
Seminar date 03 June 2013 
Course BUSN89, Degree Project in Corporate and Financial 
Management, 15 ECTS credits 
Authors Johanna Linnard and Camilla Nordberg 
Supervisor Jens Forssbaeck 
Keywords Corporate Liquidity, Cash Holdings, Lines of Credit, 
Financial Crisis, Capital Structure 
Aim and Objective The objective of this study is to empirically investigate the 
determinants of liquidity holdings in Swedish listed firms. 
By including both lines of credit and cash, this study aims 
to extend the scope of previous work within the field and 
shed light on the important role of lines of credit in 
corporate liquidity management. Further, by incorporating 
a time period covering the recent financial crisis, this study 
investigates whether determinants of corporate liquidity 
holdings vary with changes in the financial environment. 
Methodology This study is undertaken using a deductive and quantitative 
approach. The determinants of corporate liquidity are 
investigated using the least square method on a panel data 
set as well as on a cross-sectional data set. 
Theoretical perspectives The theoretical framework consists of traditional capital 
structure theories, namely the trade-off theory and the 
financing hierarchy model. 
Empirical foundation This study empirically investigates a sample consisting of 
163 survivors and non-survivors listed on the NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm during 2007-2011. Data on lines of credit 
are collected manually for a subsample of the 2007 and 
2011 firm observations, totalling 197 observations. 
Conclusions The findings of this study imply that lines of credit 
constitute the majority of Swedish firms’ liquid holdings 
confirming that this source of liquidity should not be 
overlooked within corporate liquidity literature. The results 
further show that the use of lines of credit is even more 
pronounced post-crisis than pre-crisis. Looking at 
determinants of corporate liquidity, this study concludes 
that both the trade-off model and the financing hierarchy 
model play important roles, although none of the theories 
fully explain these determinants. Finally, this study finds 
several determinants behind the proportionality of lines of 
credit and cash in total liquidity, but also that there are 
differences pre- and post-crisis.  
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The current increasing cash levels in corporations has drawn considerable attention to 
the question regarding the role of cash in firms’ capital structure. Sanchez and 
Yurdagul (2013) find that US firms’ cash levels are record-high, and that the 
development has been positive almost consistently since mid-1990s, with an 
exception for the slow-down around the financial crisis. They find that the cash to net 
assets ratio in 2011 exceeds 12%, which is more than double compared to 1995. The 
increasing corporate cash levels have engaged academics and several studies have 
investigated what drives the development (e.g. Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009; Lins, 
Servaes, & Tufano, 2010). A proposed explanation is the benefit of financial 
flexibility that cash provides, and that firms pile cash for precautionary reasons (Bates 
et al., 2009; Lins et al., 2010; Sanchez & Yurdagul, 2013).  
 
Pettit debates that the role of cash within corporate capital structure decisions is 
increasing and that “the optimal capital structure question is expanding to include the 
left-hand side of the balance sheet. It is now as much a question of cash balances and 
pension assets as it is about financial leverage” (Pettit, 2007, p. 97). 
 
During times of financial constraint cash is especially important, since external 
financing becomes more expensive and less available. In such times, firms tend to 
increase cash levels and adopt more conservative financial policies (Song & Lee, 
2012). Several studies have investigated the role of cash in the recent credit crisis, 
concluding that the corporate performance and corporate investment within firms with 
larger cash reserves was less affected by the crisis compared with firms with less cash 
reserves (e.g., Adjei 2011; Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010).  
 
In a frictionless world, however, the value of the firm is independent of the choice of 
financing. Hence, firms would not have to hold cash, as external financing is available 
at a fair price at all times (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). In reality though, the existence 
of market imperfections provides rationale for holding cash, in particular when 
transaction costs are material and when external financing is expensive or not 
available (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Traditionally, two main 
theories are put forward to explain firms’ capital structure decisions – the trade-off 
theory and the financing hierarchy theory. These two theories also provide a 
theoretical framework in corporate liquidity literature and are used to understand 
firms’ incentives to hold cash. The trade-off model of liquid holdings postulates that 
firms consider the marginal costs and marginal benefits of holding cash to determine 
the optimal level of cash holdings (Kim, Mauer & Sherman, 1998). Benefits 
associated with holding cash highlighted in the literature are for example the 
decreased probability of financial distress, the low transaction cost, and the ability it 
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provides to finance investments when other means of financing are not available 
(Keynes, 1934; Whalen, 1966). On the other hand, the cost of cash is that it carries a 
low rate of return (Baumol, 1952). This is referred to as the liquidity premium of cash 
and reflects the benefit of low transaction cost associated with liquid assets (Keynes, 
1934; Miller 1986). Thus, there is an opportunity cost entailed to holding cash and 
liquid assets. However, the opportunity cost is expected to be lower in low interest 
rate environments (Opler et al., 1999), again highlighting the topicality of cash as 
recent years have been characterized with low interest rates. 
 
The financing hierarchy theory suggests that there is no optimal amount of cash but 
that firms rather choose the mean of financing that is associated with the lowest cost 
of information asymmetry. Firms prefer to finance its investments with internal funds, 
and will only raise external capital if such funds are insufficient. Under this view, the 
amount of cash held in a firm is solely the outcome of its profitability, payout policy, 
and investment outlays. (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
 
Opler et al. (1999), one of the most cited studies within the field of cash holdings, find 
evidence supporting the trade-off model when examining the determinants and 
implications of firms’ cash holdings on a US sample during 1971-1994. They find 
that firms’ cash balances are mean reverting indicating that firms do have target cash 
levels. They find additional support for the trade-off view when concluding that 
certain firm characteristics can explain cash levels, all together indicating that firms 
do consider marginal benefits and marginal costs to identify optimal level of cash 
holdings. The results indicate that firms with better access to capital market, such as 
large firms, tend to hold less cash. Cash holdings also decrease with net working 
capital and with leverage, and if the firm is paying dividends. Small firms, firms with 
higher cash flow volatility, and firms with strong growth opportunity, tend to hold 
larger amounts of cash. 
 
Several studies have further contributed to the field, with explanations regarding 
determinants of cash holdings. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) find on a sample consisting 
of publicly traded firms in EMU countries that cash holdings increase with investment 
opportunities and decrease with level of liquid asset substitution. In addition, large 
and levered firms tend to hold less cash than others. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) provide 
evidence that cash flow and growth opportunities have a positive impact on the level 
of cash holdings in their UK sample. They also find that ownership structure plays an 
important role. Guney, Ozkan and Ozkan (2007) provide empirical evidence that there 
exists a non-linear relationship between cash holdings and leverage, more 
specifically; cash is negatively related to leverage for firms with low leverage and 
positively related in the more levered firms. 
 
Despite the growing literature on determinants of corporate cash holding, there is no 
theory that can unanimously explain the empirical results. For example, studies have 
found a negative relationship between cash holdings and size which supports the 
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trade-off theory but is in conflict with the financing hierarchy theory, whereas the 
positive relationship between cash holdings and cash flow generation is in line with 
financing hierarchy theory but contradicts the predictions of the trade-off theory (e.g., 
Ferreira & Vilela 2004; Opler et al. 1999; Drobetz & Gruninger 2007). It is thus 
argued that both the trade-off theory and the financing hierarchy theory are useful in 
explaining determinants of corporate cash levels. In addition, the results regarding the 
determinants of firms’ cash holdings are not necessary consistent over the studies. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find no support that size negatively affects cash holdings 
and Kim et al., (1998) find that there exists a negative, rather than a positive, 
relationship between cash flow and cash levels. This indicates that there are issues 
that need to be addressed further as the field of cash holdings develops and expands 
its empirical scope.  
 
1.1 Problem Discussion 
What previous studies have not managed to include in their analysis of level of cash 
holdings is the available cash for firms in form of undrawn lines of credit, as such 
data must be collected manually. In addition, International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), which are the accounting standards that all publicly traded 
companies within the European Union has to follow when reporting consolidated 
accounts (Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
2002), does not require firms to disclose information regarding amounts under lines of 
credit available to the company (IAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows). Lins et al. (2010) 
find in their survey-based research covering 29 countries that lines of credit are the 
dominant source of liquidity for most of the companies, and that both cash and lines 
of credit are being considered when implementing liquidity policy. Excluding lines of 
credit could hence lead to conclusions being drawn on firms’ use of liquid sources in 
an incorrect way. While there has been extensive prior research on lines of credit 
(e.g., Boot, Thakor, & Udell, 1987; Holmström and Tirole 1998; Martin and 
Santomero 1997), few studies incorporate both lines of credit and cash when 
analyzing corporate liquidity, despite the similarities in the literature on the two areas 
of research (Sufi 2009).  
 
Sufi (2009) provide a seminal work were he quantitatively examines the factors 
affecting firms’ choice between lines of credit and cash in their corporate liquidity 
management. The results indicate that cash flow is a strong predictor of whether firms 
choose to rely on cash holdings or on lines of credit. Weak cash flows or high cash 
flow volatility characterizes the firms that rely on cash rather than lines of credit. 
These firms are less likely to obtain lines of credit, and consequently, they rely on 
internally generated funds to a greater extent. According to Sufi (2009), lines of credit 
are hence liquidity substitutes mainly for firms with strong cash flows. Campello, 
Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) provide insight regarding the role of lines of 
credit in firms’ liquidity management in financially constraint times, examining how 
firms used their internal and external sources of liquidity during 2008 and 2009. The 
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result indicates that lines of credit eased the negative impact of the financial crisis on 
firms, highlighting that lines of credit play a significant role in firms’ liquidity 
management and should not be a neglected component.   
 
The determinants of cash holdings have in recent years been relatively well debated in 
academic literature. However, there are few studies that cover the Nordic countries 
and none that, to the authors' knowledge, focus on Sweden. Research has shown that 
cash holdings vary significantly across countries, much explained by different 
regulations and financial policies (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003). It is thus 
difficult to generalize results from previous research and infer that the findings also 
hold on the Swedish market. 
 
An extension of previous research would thus be to investigate whether Swedish 
firms’ cash levels has developed in a similar way as demonstrated in previous 
research, and whether the determinants of Swedish corporate cash levels are similar to 
those found in previous research. To further improve the analysis of Swedish firms’ 
liquidity management this study will, following Sufi (2009), include both cash1 and 
undrawn lines of credit as a measure of total liquidity available for firms, and examine 
what might determine the choice between the two. This study is, to our knowledge, 
the first to quantitatively investigate firms’ use of both cash and lines of credit in a 
European country.  
 
As previously mentioned, both cash and lines of credit have been proven to have 
played an important role in the recent financial crisis and it is therefore of interest to 
more thoroughly examine whether the results differ pre- and post-crisis. This study 
will employ a sample that covers the period of 2007-2011, which enables an analysis 
of whether determinants of corporate liquidity holdings vary with changes in the 
financial environment. Although the effects of the financial crisis might not be 
completely cleared in 2011, this year will be referred to as post-crisis as it is the best 
estimate available at the time of conducting this study. Finally, we recognize that the 
majority of the existing literature on corporate liquidity use historical data to measure 
firms’ liquidity management, and do not incorporate any time varying components. 
However, the level of liquid holdings can also be defined as the present as well as 
expected future sources and uses of liquidity. This study will as a final step also 
employ a liquidity ratio similar to that used by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and also by 
practitioners within the field of liquidity management, as an extension to existing 
measurements of liquidity. 
 
                                                
1 Cash is always defined as cash and marketable securities. Although interchangeably referred to as 
cash, cash and marketable securities, and cash and cash equivalents.   
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1.2 Aim and Objective 
The aim of this study is to empirically investigate the determinants of cash holdings 
among Swedish listed firms during 2007-2011, and whether these have changed over 
the years, pre- and post-crisis. By adding lines of credit to the cash measurement the 
study aims to extend the scope of previous work within the field. In addition, the 
study aims to investigate the relationship between cash and lines of credit in firms’ 
liquidity management and whether certain firm characteristics can explain if firms are 
more prone to rely on one more than the other.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
Our research question is two fold:  
(i) What determines corporate liquidity in Swedish listed firms 2007-2011?  
(ii) What determines the use of lines of credit as opposed to cash within the 
corporate liquidity management of Swedish listed firms 2007 and 2011? 
 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
This study will empirically investigate a sample consisting of 163 survivors and non-
survivors listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm during 2007-2011. As previously 
mentioned, data on lines of credit is not available in financial databases but has to be 
collected manually. This limits the time horizon of the sample that can be covered 
within the scope of this study. The analysis of lines of credit will be concentrated to 
the years of 2007 and 2011, and data on lines of credit will be collected for a 
subsample consisting of these two years only, while data for other variables will be 
collected for the full period.  
 
Although, no formal definition of corporate liquidity exists, it typically refers to 
corporate cash (core and strategic), lines of credit, and assets that can easily be 
converted to cash (Servaes and Tufano, 2006). When referring to liquidity and 
liquidity management in this paper, it will concern corporate cash and lines of credit 
solely (in line with e.g., Sufi 2009; Lins et al., 2010) to capture the amount of cash as 
well as pre-negotiated liquidity that is available to firms.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework relevant for this study. The theory of 
cash holdings is derived from the traditional capital structure theories such as the 
trade-off theory and the financing hierarchy theory. The theory of lines of credit build 
largely upon the theory of cash but includes a profound discussion on the differences 
between the two liquidity components. The chapter further presents a review of 
previous empirical findings regarding corporate cash and lines of credit, relevant for 
this study. Finally, based on previous discussion on the theoretical predictions of 
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corporate liquidity, multiple hypotheses are derived to guide through the empirical 
investigation in this study.  
  
Chapter 3 presents the research methodology employed in this study, together with 
the data sample and several variables that are predicted to have a determining effect 
on corporate liquidity. The chapter provides detailed information regarding the 
applied methods and econometric approach in order to enable future studies to 
replicate the used framework. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the empirical investigation together with an analysis 
of its theoretical implications. The chapter begins with descriptive statistics over the 
full sample and the subsample respectively in order to enable a more complete 
discussion on liquid holdings within the studied firms. Following this, the results of 
the regression analysis are presented and discussed. The results are analyzed both in 
context of theoretical predictions and previous empirical findings.  
 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and presents the conclusions of corporate liquidity 
determinants established in this study. Finally, suggestions for future research are 
outlined.  
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 2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Cash in a Perfect Market 
In 1958, Modigliani and Miller presented their seminal work proposing that, under 
certain restrictive assumptions2, firm value is independent of capital structure. In such 
capital markets, described as a perfect or frictionless, financial decisions do not affect 
shareholders’ wealth (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). If a firm faces cash shortage it can 
turn to external financing to pursue a positive net present value investment at zero 
cost. On the other hand, following the irrelevance argument there is no liquidity 
premium associated with holding cash, and thus investing in liquid asset entails no 
opportunity cost, meaning that firm value is unaffected also if a firm chooses to hold 
cash (Opler et al., 1999). However, introducing market imperfections such as 
transaction costs and information asymmetries cause cash holdings to matter. For 
instance, if a firm has to forgo a positive net present value project when internal cash 
generation is insufficient and external financing is unavailable (or too costly), holding 
cash reserves enable firms to pursue value-creating investments (Opler et al. 1999).  
 
In capital structure literature, two main theories have emerged after Modigliani and 
Miller’s capital structure irrelevance principle, the trade-off theory and the financing 
hierarchy theory. These two theories also provide a theoretical framework in liquidity 
literature by explaining corporate cash holdings (see e.g., Dittmar et al. 2003; Ferreira 
& Vilela, 2004; Opler et al. 1999).  
 
2.2 Theoretical Motives for Holding Cash 
2.2.1 The Trade-Off Theory  
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) argued that the existence of the market imperfections, 
corporate taxation and bankruptcy penalties result in a firm being dependent on its 
choice of capital structure. They suggest that the optimal capital structure is a trade-
off between the cost and benefit of debt, i.e. the bankruptcy penalties and the tax 
advantage (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). Contemporary liquidity literature suggests 
that the same argument can be used when analyzing firms’ optimal cash level, namely 
                                                
2 Key assumptions of perfect capital markets (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) 
• Two types of securities exit that firms can issue, both with equal cost of capital; equity and 
risk-free debt 
• There are no transaction costs 
• There are no bankruptcy costs 
• There are no taxation costs 
• There is homogeneous information available to all investors at all times 
• There are no conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. 
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that the optimal level of cash is a trade-off between the associated costs and the 
benefits (see e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreria & Vilela, 2004; Opler et al., 1999).  
 
Keynes (1934) described two motives for holding cash; the transaction cost motive 
and the precautionary motive, which later in liquidity literature have been referred to 
as the two main benefits of holding cash (see e.g. Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007; Opler 
et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). Kim et al. (1998) developed a model where it is 
suggested that firms consider the benefit of holding cash against the low rate of return 
liquid assets yield. The agency cost of managerial discretion, based on the argument 
of Jensen (1986) that managers have an incentive to hold cash to pursue their own 
objectives, is another cost of cash highlighted in the literature (see e.g., Bates et al., 
2009; Dittmar et al., 2003; Opler et al., 1999). More recent research also emphasizes 
the tax implication of cash as one of the factors that firms consider in their trade-off 
(e.g., Bates et al., 2009; Servaes and Tufano, 2006). 
 
Opler et al. (1999) intuitively describe the logic behind firms’ trade-off between costs 
and benefits of cash. If being short of cash hinders firms from pursuing value-creating 
projects or hampers its operations, there is a cost associated with liquid asset shortage. 
Holding cash reserves reduce the probability of cash shortage, which is valuable, and 
accordingly there is a benefit of cash. A value maximizing firm should weight the 
marginal benefit of holding cash against the associated marginal cost and actively 
adjust the cash levels towards an optimal level, where marginal cost of liquid asset 
shortage equals marginal cost of liquid assets as shown in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Optimal Level of Liquid Assets (Opler et al., 1999) 
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The remainder of this section will discuss the costs and benefits of holding cash that 
firms are assumed to face, and the theoretical implications of these costs and benefits 
on the level of cash holdings. 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Costs of Holding Cash 
Cost of Carry 
One cost considered to determine the optimal size of cash balance is the opportunity 
cost of holding cash (see e.g., Baumol, 1952; Whalen, 1966). In a perfect capital 
market, a firm can raise debt and hold as cash on the balance sheet at no cost, since 
cash will generate the same interest as charged for the debt. In reality however, the 
cost of debt is likely to be greater than the return on cash (Miller, 1986). If assuming 
that managers act in shareholders’ interest and maximizes firm value, the only cost of 
cash is the difference between return on cash and the interest paid to finance another 
investment of the same risk. This opportunity cost, often called cost of carry, affects 
firm value negatively and is borne by the shareholders. (Servaes and Tufano, 2006) 
 
Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion3 
If the assumption of aligned interests between managers and shareholders is relaxed, 
managers may hold cash to pursue its own objective rather than maximize 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen, 1986). Jensen (1986) argues that managers have an 
incentive to hoard cash as it allows them to stay independent from capital markets and 
remain control over the firm’s assets. With cash readily available, managers can 
pursue investments that are value destroying, which capital market does not agree to 
finance. Investing in cash can hence have negative impact on firm value as it allows 
management to avoid the discipline of capital markets (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  
 
Previous research has used several variables to proxy the extent a firm may suffer 
from agency cost of managerial discretion. Opler et al. (1999) argue that firms with 
valuable investment opportunities may have less severe problems with agency cost of 
managerial discretion, as the objectives of management and shareholders are more 
likely aligned. At the same time, if a firm has few valuable investment opportunities, 
it would be more difficult for management to obtain external financing, hence cash 
reserves become critical if management wants to pursue investments of own interest. 
The monitoring function of debt is assumed to reduce agency costs as suggested in 
Jensen’s (1984) control hypothesis, hence firms with low leverage can hold more cash 
because such firms are less subject to capital market monitoring. Finally, it is assumed 
that larger firms should have larger shareholder dispersion, which in turn can give rise 
to managerial discretion (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).  
 
                                                
3 Also commonly referred to as Jensen’s Free Cash Flow hypothesis 
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Tax Implications 
Modigliani and Miller presented in 1963 a corrected version of their publication in 
1958 where they take corporate taxation into account in the discussion of capital 
structure. When introducing taxes, there are certain benefits of raising debt that firms 
forgo when instead using cash reserves to finance investments. Interest payments on 
debt are tax deductible, hence using debt decreases the tax paid by the firm, which 
ultimately increases shareholder value. Further, taxes are disadvantageous for 
shareholders, since the interest income that cash generates is taxed twice, first on 
corporate level and then on the individual shareholder level, which significantly 
lowers the interest gain (Masulis & Trueman, 1988). 
 
2.2.1.2 Benefits of Holding Cash 
Transaction Cost Motive  
The transaction cost motive, first introduced by Keynes (1936), postulates that when 
introducing transaction costs in capital markets, firms have an incentive to hold cash 
reserves because it is costly to convert cash substitutes into cash. Classic money 
demand models (e.g., Baumol, 1952; Miller & Orr, 1966; Tobin, 1956) derive optimal 
cash demand recognizing such transaction costs. Trading financial and real assets are 
assumed to involve both a fixed and a variable cost. The fixed cost makes it less 
attractive to frequently raise funding externally, and encourage firms to instead hold 
cash as a buffer. This further implies that there are economies of scale in cash 
management. Opler et al. (1999) emphasize that the variable component results in 
greater shortages costing more, as the firm has to cut back on larger amounts of 
investments, liquidate larger amounts of assets, or raise larger amounts of external 
funding. When the cost or probability of liquid asset shortage increases, the marginal 
cost curve in figure 2.1 shifts outwards and increases the firm’s optimal level of liquid 
asset holdings.  
 
The transaction cost motive suggests that firms hold cash reserves in order to avoid 
transaction costs, hence avoid the marginal cost of cash shortage. Liquidity literature 
put forward several variables to proxy for this cost, which are used within the trade-
off framework to understand how firms estimate an optimal cash level. The 
economies of scale in cash management suggest that it is more costly for smaller 
firms to raise external funding, hence, theory predicts that smaller firms hold more 
cash compared to larger firms (Barclay & Smith 1996; Kim et al., 1998). Smaller 
firms are in general expected to have inferior access to capital markets and face 
higher transaction costs compared to larger firms (Opler et al., 1999). A related 
argument is that firms with lower probability of financial distress face lower 
transaction costs and therefore hold less cash (Kim et al., 1998).  
 
Further, since firms with greater growth opportunities face greater losses when 
incurring cash shortage, as they have to give up more valuable projects, they are 
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expected to hold more cash (Opler et al., 1999). To the extent that the amount of 
capital expenditures captures the future investment demand, it is expected that 
investment intensive firms also need to hold more cash to avoid losses associated with 
cancelled investments (Dittmar et al., 2003). It is also expected that firms with more 
volatile and/or lower cash flows hold more cash reserves because they face a greater 
probability of cash shortage (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999). Moreover, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992) argue that one way to raise funds is through the liquidation of 
assets, hence the level of assets available to (cost-efficiently) liquidate when facing 
cash shortage affects the amount of cash held as a buffer. Baskin (1987) suggest that 
the cost of investing in liquid funds increases with leverage and that highly levered 
firms are for that reason expected to hold less cash. Finally, dividend-paying firms are 
expected to be able to raise funds relatively easy by simply cutting their dividend 
payments, and therefore hold less cash (Opler et al., 1999). 
 
All in all, in the presence of transaction costs, it is expected that assets that can cost-
efficiently be converted into cash carries a lower rate of return reflecting the benefit 
of minimizing the transaction costs (Keynes, 1936). Such premium is expected to be 
highest for cash and decrease with the illiquidity of an asset (see Baumol, 1952; 
Miller, 1986). The previously discussed cost of carry of cash hence increases with 
transaction costs (Opler et al., 1999). 
 
Precautionary Motive 
Keynes (1936) suggests another motive for holding cash in which firms aim at 
reducing the risk of future cash shortfalls. Whalen (1966) argues that the optimal level 
of such precautionary cash depends on the cost of illiquidity. Raising funds externally 
does not only result in direct costs, such as underwriting fees, but also various indirect 
costs (Servaes and Tufano, 2006). The precautionary motive, as discussed in more 
recent liquidity literature on corporate cash determinants (Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007; Opler et al., 1999), puts forth indirect costs such as 
information asymmetries, agency costs of debt and the opportunity cost of foregone 
investments of which firms strive to insure themselves against. To avoid dependency 
on external capital markets, which might be expensive when recognizing the 
previously mentioned costs, firms instead accumulate liquidity reserves (Servaes & 
Tufano, 2006).  
 
Looking at information asymmetries first, Myers and Majluf (1984) discuss the 
implications of outsiders being less informed of the prospect of the firm than insiders, 
making it more difficult for outsiders to recognize the true value of the securities they 
purchase. They suggest that outsiders discount to ensure that they do not pay a 
premium due to overvaluation. However, it is possible that the discounting results in 
undervaluation to such an extent that the firm finds it more profitable to cancel its 
investment project rather than selling the securities at the discounted price. 
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As a proxy for degree of information asymmetry, liquidity literature suggests the level 
of research and development expenses (R&D) arguing that R&D-intensive firms are 
in nature more opaque and thus more likely to be incorrectly valued (e.g. Dittmar et 
al., 2003; Opler et al., 1999; Servaes & Tufano, 2006). Consequently, it is expected 
that firms with large R&D expenses hold more cash to compensate (Opler et al. 
1999). Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the firms whose value is determined by 
growth opportunities are subject to more severe information asymmetry problems. It 
is also argued that such firms have greater incentive to hold cash for precautionary 
reasons because it is more costly for them to pass up investment opportunities 
(Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007). In addition, smaller firms are expected to face larger 
information asymmetries compared to larger firms, and accordingly experience more 
borrowing constraints and face higher cost of external financing (e.g., Collins, 
Kothari, & Rayburn, 1987; Brennan and Hughes, 1991). Firms with greater 
information asymmetries are also expected to hold more short-term debt relative to 
long-term debt (Flannery 1986), and it can therefore be expected that the debt 
maturity structure affect the amount of liquid assets firms choose to hold (Garcia-
Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2008).  
 
Secondly, agency costs of debt, arising from conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debt holders, can result in costly problems such as underinvestment 
and asset substitution, as discussed by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
increasing the cost of external financing. Highly levered firms are expected to 
experience agency costs of debt to a greater extent compared to less levered firms, 
and are hence expected to hold more cash for precautionary reasons (Opler et al., 
1999). They are also expected to be more constrained regarding access to external 
funds, again suggesting that they hold more cash for precautionary reasons (Guney et 
al., 2007). In addition, Myers (1977) argue that growth firms face greater agency 
costs, as risky debt causing underinvestment problems result in such firms having to 
forego valuable growth options. Bates et al. (2009) predicts that cash held for the 
purpose of avoiding capital markets, increase with uncertainty of future cash flow, 
and that there therefore exists a positive relationship between cash levels and cash 
flow volatility. Finally, firms in financial distress might choose to increase their cash 
reserves in order to the decrease the risk of default, which would result in a positive 
relationship between cash holdings and probability of default (Ferreria and Vilela, 
2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). 
 
2.2.2 The Financing Hierarchy Theory 
As previously discussed, introducing information asymmetries makes externally 
raised funding expensive. Costs arising from asymmetric information can either be 
viewed as additional costs that firms consider in their trade-off, or as prohibitive 
(Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007).  If seen as prohibitive, firms might choose to avoid 
external financing resulting in a pecking order behavior, as described by Myers and 
 13 
Majluf (1984). The financing hierarchy model suggests that firms prefer to finance its 
investments with internally generated funds, and if such funds are insufficient it will 
use its liquid asset reserves before raising funds externally. Equity is assumed to be 
subject to greater adverse selection costs, and firms will therefore choose debt as 
opposed to equity. The model suggest that firms with strong cash flows will pay down 
their debt and invest the surplus of internally generated funds in liquid reserves. 
Hence, the level of liquid assets is a function of the profitability of the firm as well as 
the investment and financing decisions made by the firm. As such, there is no optimal 
level of cash as suggested in the trade-off theory. (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 
1984)  
 
The financing hierarchy predictions of cash holdings are not entirely different from 
the ones suggested by the trade-off model, which makes it somewhat difficult to 
empirically distinguish between the two models (see Dittmar et al., 2003; Opler et al., 
1999).  However, the cost of external financing plays a more important role in the 
financing hierarchy model. The previously discussed variables for information 
asymmetry used in earlier literature are assumed to serve as an approximation for the 
financing hierarchy model as well. One clear difference from the trade-off model is 
that the financing hierarchy model views cash as negative debt. When investments 
exceed internally generated funds, debt increases, and when internally generated 
funds exceed investments, debt decreases (Myers, 1984). Another important 
difference from the trade-off view on cash holdings is that the financing hierarchy 
predicts cash to be negatively correlated to corporate investments. It is assumed that 
firms with high investment intensity accumulate less cash compared to firms with 
lower investment intensity.  
 
Moreover, contradicting the trade-off view, cash holdings are expected to increase 
with firm size, because larger firms are expected to have been more profitable 
historically and thus accumulated more cash. Similarly, it is assumed that firms with 
strong cash flow generation hold more cash because internal cash surplus can be 
invested in liquid reserves (Opler et al., 1999). Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
argue that firms with strong cash flows also often are characterized with high market-
to-book ratios because they are expected to be profitable in the future. As such, firms 
with higher market-to-book ratios might also hold more cash. This prediction is in 
line with that of the trade-off model, although, the explanation is rather because of 
strong cash generation and not because of higher cost of cash shortage (as suggested 
in the trade-off model). 
 
Finally, the financing hierarchy theory predicts, again in line with trade-off theory, a 
negative relation between cash and dividends. However the explanation is that 
distributing dividends simply decrease the amount for cash accumulation. Myers 
(1984) argue that because dividends are sticky, firms first decrease its cash reserves 
when internally generated cash is less than investment outlays, before cutting back on 
dividends. 
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Table 2.1 – Predicted Relationship of Liquidity Determinants by Respective Theory 
 
 
2.3 Theoretical Motives for Using Lines of Credit 
Under perfect capital market assumptions cash and lines of credit are to be seen as 
perfect substitutes and firm value is unaffected of whether a firm chooses to hold one 
over the other. However, as before, introducing market imperfections results in the 
amount of cash and lines of credit to matter. Much of the literature on corporate 
liquidity focus on the role of cash, but the intuition generally applies to lines of credit 
as well (Lins et al., 2010). As previously discussed, cash is important for firms to be 
able to finance valuable projects when market frictions make external funding 
disadvantageous. The same applies for lines of credit, which are argued to provide an 
option-like cash equivalent (e.g., Boot et al., 1987; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1998; 
Melnik and Plaut, 1986). The remainder of this section will discuss the main motives 
of using lines of credit also commenting on the main limitations with using lines of 
credit as a source of liquidity. 
 
2.3.1 Rate of Return 
As highlighted in 2.2.1, a disadvantage of cash is the low rate of return it earns. 
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2012) model the trade-off a firm faces when it 
comes to holding cash and using lines of credit. They put forward one disadvantage of 
holding cash, as opposed to lines of credit, which is the absence of the liquidity 
premium. Instead of holding liquid assets that generates low rate of return, firms 
might manage their liquidity needs by using credit lines.  
 
2.3.2 Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion 
Cash exposes firms to managerial opportunism, as discussed by Jensen (1986). Lines 
of credit however, limit this problem through monitoring, covenants and various 
payment requirements (e.g. banking fees) that managers must meet. In other words, 
Transaction Cost Motive Precationary Motive Agency Cost of Managerial Discretion
Growth Opportunities + + - +
Firm Size - - + +
Cash Generation - +
Working Capital Intensity -
Investment Intensity + -
Leverage - + - -
Debt Maturity - -
R&D Intensity + + -
Probability of Default + + -
Cash Flow Volatility + +
Seasonality + +
Dividend - -
Summary of predicted relationship on liquidity by theory
Trade-Off Theory
Financing Hierarchy 
Theory
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lines of credit grant managers’ conditional control right only under certain restrictions 
(Yun, 2009). Boot et al. (1987) motivate the use of lines of credit arguing that moral 
hazard problem makes it difficult to observe managers effort but that lines of credit 
are capable of eliminating potential value destruction due to agency costs of 
managerial discretion. Yun (2009) suggests that it can be value increasing for firms 
with weak internal governance to reduce cash levels and replace with lines of credit. 
The previously discussed variables for agency cost approximation, i.e. growth 
opportunities, firm size and leverage, can be expected to explain what type of firms 
choose to rely on lines of credit over cash reserves and vice versa. Entrenched 
management in firms with relatively low growth opportunities are suggested to rely 
on cash to a greater extent to pursue opportunistic investments, because they are 
expected to find it difficult to obtain external funding. Larger firms are in addition 
expected to have larger shareholder dispersion, which can give rise to managerial 
discretion. Finally, firms with lower leverage are less subject to monitoring, which 
also can give rise to managerial discretion. In conclusion, firms with high quality 
corporate governance policies are expected to be more likely to view cash and lines of 
credit as liquidity substitutes compared to firms with lower corporate governance 
quality (Yun, 2009). 
 
2.3.3 Tax Implications 
The effect of taxation on cash as opposed to lines of credit may affect firms’ choice 
between the two sources of liquidity. While firms forgo benefits of raising debt when 
instead using cash reserves to finance investments as discussed in 2.2.1.1, interest 
payments on lines of credit are tax-deductible. Using lines of credit over cash 
therefore provides firms with a value-creating tax shield while serving the same 
purpose of meeting firms’ liquidity needs (Demiroglu & James, 2011). 
  
2.3.4 Transaction Cost Motive 
As discussed in 2.2.1.2 there are transaction costs associated with raising external 
funds and firms with liquid asset reserves may avoid such costs. Flannery and 
Lockhart (2009) put forward that the ex post fixed costs associated with credit lines 
are minimal. They argue that if transaction costs are material (for equity and regular 
debt issuance), lines of credit should play an important role in firms’ liquidity 
management and ultimately affect shareholders’ wealth positively. Similar predictions 
regarding variables as discussed in section 2.2.1.2 are expected for lines of credit 
under the assumption that firms view lines of credit as a cash-equivalent component 
in their liquidity management. 
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2.3.5 Precautionary Motive 
The liquidity literature suggest that it is valuable to hold liquid resources in capital 
markets with information asymmetries because it provides firms with the security to 
pursue investment opportunities even at times when cost of external capital is too 
high, e.g. when securities are underpriced (see Acharya, Almeida & Campello, 2007; 
Almeida et al., 2004; Myers & Majluf 1984). Under the assumption that lines of 
credits can be accessed unconditionally, lines of credit provide the same 
precautionary benefit as cash (Lins et al., 2010). In fact, Flannery and Lockhart 
(2009) suggest that lines of credit can weaken firms’ incentive to hold precautionary 
cash, because precautionary liquidity could instead be held in the form of lines of 
credit, which provide the same benefit but do not entail the same cost of carry and 
agency cost of managerial discretion as cash does. 
  
2.3.6 Limitations of Lines of Credit 
As mentioned, theory suggests that lines of credit protect firms against future liquidity 
shortfalls and acts as an insurance that enable firms to pursue valuable projects. 
However, the insurance is likely to be incomplete because, as Sufi (2009) highlights, 
lines of credits provide conditional liquidity in most cases. One contingency is the 
financial health of the firm, as an option-like credit line can be exercised only if 
certain financial covenants are being fulfilled. A second contingency is the financial 
health of the lender, as the possibility that the lender may not be able to provide funds 
when a firm wishes to draw on its credit line (Demiroglu & James, 2011). Finally, the 
available line of credit is contingent on the value of the pledged collateral, often 
accounts receivables or inventories, and the amount available might fluctuate with the 
value of the asset collateralized (Flannery & Wang, 2011). Sufi (2009) therefore 
suggests that the lines of credit available for firms in reality are somewhat different 
from the ones described in the theoretical literature because they are in fact contingent 
and not always a fully committed source of liquidity.  
 
Cash and lines of credit are hence not perfect substitutes, and the demand for lines of 
credit should not necessary equal demand for cash. Several firm specific 
characteristics are put forward to proxy for to what extent firms view lines of credit as 
cash equivalent, based on the above discussion on contingency. Firms with poor 
credit quality are more limited in accessing lines of credit and thus there is an 
expected negative relationship between probability of default and the use of lines of 
credit (Demiroglu, James & Kizilaslan, 2009). Because of financial covenants of lines 
of credit, it is expected that firms with weaker cash flows find lines of credit less of a 
cash substitute, because the credit line may not be available when most needed, and 
therefore they choose to rely on cash reserves rather than conditional credit (Sufi, 
2009). The same argument applies for firms with relatively high cash flow variability, 
which might find cash more favorable due to the, often cash flow based, restrictive 
covenants. However, as suggested by Sufi (2009) it might be that firms with higher 
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variability in cash flows enjoy the flexibility of lines of credit, and to a greater extent 
rely on this source of financing as opposed to cash to manage their working capital 
and inventories. It is further suggested that size is predictor in whether firms use cash 
or lines of credit, because large firms are assumed to have better access to lines of 
credit compared to smaller firms (Sufi, 2009). Larger firms might also be more 
transparent and less risky, ultimately resulting in more favorable credit terms, and 
greater usage of lines of credit (Demiroglu and James, 2010). However, to the extent 
that larger firms have larger shareholder dispersion (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004), which 
can give rise to managerial discretion, a plausible interpretation is that lines of credit 
is negatively related to firm size.  
 
Firms whose value largely consists of growth opportunities tend to be less levered, 
therefore it can be expected that such firms do not rely primarily on lines of credit but 
rather on cash (Sufi, 2009). However, entrenched management of firms with low 
growth opportunities are expected to prefer cash to lines of credit in order to stay 
independent of capital markets. Although the problem of opportunistic cash hoarding 
is expected to decrease with growth opportunities. A positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and use of lines of credit is therefore suggested by the agency 
cost of managerial discretion theory. Growth firms and R&D intensive firms are 
further expected to experience more tight covenants since they are less transparent 
(and associated with greater information symmetries), thus finding lines of credit less 
equivalent to cash (Demirouglu & James, 2010). Finally, dividend paying firms are 
less likely to view lines of credit as a cash substitute because covenants typically 
restrict payouts in breach of covenants, hence in order to avoid cutting dividends in 
case of impaired economic condition, firms should choose to hold cash (Nini, Smith, 
& Sufi, 2009; Lins et al., 2010).  
 
Table 2.2 - Predicted Impact on Use of Lines of Credit over Cash with Corresponding Explanation 
 
 
Impact on Use of Lines 
of Credit over Cash Explanation
Growth Opportunities +/- Information Asymmetries / Credit Terms
Firm Size +/- Access to Credit / Agency Cost of Managerial Discretion
Cash Generation + Credit Terms
Working Capital Intensity + Borrowing Base
Investment Intensity
Leverage + Agency Cost of Managerial Discretion
Debt Maturity
R&D Intensity - Information Asymmetries
Probability of Default - Credit Terms
Cash Flow Volatility +/- Flexibility / Credit Terms
Seasonality +/- Flexibility / Credit Terms
Dividend - Credit Terms
Summary of predicted impact on use of lines of credit with additional explanation
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2.4 Review of Empirical Literature  
Kim et al. (1998) develops a trade-off model on the optimal level of liquid assets, 
suggesting that firms consider the low rate of return on cash against the flexibility 
cash provides when external financing is expensive. Testing the model on a large 
panel of US firms over 1975-1994 they find support that corporate liquidity is 
positively related to cost of external financing. Small firms and firms with larger 
market-to-book ratios, which are assumed to face larger costs of external financing, 
therefore hold more cash than other firms. In addition, they find that firms in 
industries with high average cash flow volatility hold more cash.  
 
Opler et al. (1999) considerably expand previous empirical evidence on what factors 
affect corporate liquidity. On a sample of publicly traded US firms during 1971-1994, 
they analyze corporate cash holdings using both the trade-off and the financing 
hierarchy framework. They find evidence that cash levels are mean reverting, 
supporting the trade-off theory.  However, there is also support for the financing 
hierarchy theory since changes in cash holdings and fund deficits are related. Further, 
investigating firm-specific variables’ impact on cash levels they find that small firms 
and firms with high market-to-book ratios hold more cash compared to other firms, in 
line with the result of Kim et al. (1998). The positive relation between cash and 
capital expenditure and R&D is also in line with the prediction of the trade-off model. 
However, the positive coefficients of cash flow generation and negative coefficient of 
leverage is consistent with the financing hierarchy model. The authors do not find 
support that agency costs have significant impact on cash holdings and suggest that 
more work needs to be done regarding this factor.  
 
Dittmar et al. (2003) extend the previous studies by investigating the role of corporate 
governance as a determinant of firms’ cash holdings in greater detail, using an 
international sample covering 45 countries. They find that cash holdings vary 
significantly across countries and that the differences are strongly related to the 
countries’ legal structure and shareholder protection rights (other studies highlighting 
the cross-country difference in cash holding are e.g. Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; 
Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2001). The result supports the hypothesis that managerial 
discretion affects cash holdings. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) also contribute with results 
indicating a strong relationship between firms’ corporate governance policy and the 
level of cash it chooses to hold, using a UK sample covering the period of 1984-1999. 
In addition, there is significant evidence that firms on the UK market substitute their 
non-cash liquid assets for cash and that firms with higher debt ratios hold less cash 
than others. However, there is no evidence for the more common hypotheses that 
larger firms hold less cash or that more volatile firms hold more cash. Although not 
explicitly reported here, several other studies have further investigated the role of 
corporate governance policies; among these are Couderc (2005), Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008). 
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Deloof (2001) investigate a sample of Belgian non-financial firms over the period of 
1992-1994 concluding that liquidity play an important role in firms’ choice of 
financing, just as predicted by the financing hierarchy model. The results of the firm-
specific characteristics are in line with the transaction cost motive for holding cash, 
but only partially support the precautionary motive. Drobetz and Gruninger (2007) 
investigate the determinants of cash holdings among Swiss firms between 1995-2004. 
They find support for both the precautionary motive and the transaction cost motive, 
e.g. that economies of scale result in small firms holding more cash. However, the 
negative relationship between leverage and cash reserves and the positive relationship 
between cash flow generation and cash holdings support the financing hierarchy 
model. In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) 
the authors do not find support that firms with large growth opportunities hold more 
cash.  
 
Also Ferreira and Vilela (2004), find results partially supporting the trade-off model 
and partially supporting the financing hierarchy model, studying a sample consisting 
of EMU countries during 1987-2000. For example, the negative relationship between 
firm size and cash holdings support the trade-off model, but contradicts the financing 
hierarchy model. In addition, the positive relationship between cash flow and cash 
holdings is in line with the financing hierarchy model but contradicts the prediction of 
the trade-off model. Other studies that should be mentioned among several that 
investigate firm-specific characteristics as determinants of corporate cash holding are; 
Alles, Lian, and Yan (2012), Bates et al. (2009), Buinshoofd and Kool (2004), Garcia-
Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008). 
 
Bates et al. (2009) investigate the positive development of corporate cash holdings in 
US industrial firms over the 1980-2006 period and conclude that the average cash-to-
assets ratio has more than doubled over the period (the same applies when looking at 
median values). The result shows that the average firm can retire all its debt 
obligations with its cash reserves. The main explanations behind the increase in cash 
levels are suggested to be the increasing cash flow volatility, the increasing R&D 
expenditures and the decreasing capital expenditures identified. However, the authors 
do not find any evidence that agency conflicts can explain the increasing corporate 
cash levels.  
 
Song and Lee (2012) investigate corporate liquidity management in Asian firms 
before, during, and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. They find that 
changes in cash holdings could not be explained by changes in firm characteristics, as 
suggested in previous studies, but that firms rather change their total demand for cash 
after a financial crisis. More specifically, they find that firms increased their cash 
holdings significantly during and after the crisis and that the median cash ratio almost 
doubled between 1996 and 2006. Increased sensitivity to cash flow risk is suggested 
to explain the post-crisis behavior of building up cash levels. The results indicate that 
a financial crisis has long-term effects on firms’ liquidity management and that severe 
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macroeconomic shocks cause firms to adopt more conservative policies in both 
investments and cash holdings. 
 
Sufi (2009) is the first to quantitatively examine the determinants of firms’ choice 
between lines of credit and cash in their liquidity management. The study finds that 
lines of credit are a significant component in firms’ liquidity management, on average 
accounting for 16% of book value of assets. The principal finding is that firms with 
weaker cash flow or higher cash flow volatility do not make use of lines of credit to 
the same extent, but rather rely on cash reserves.  Sufi points out that cash flow is a 
strong predictor of firms’ use of lines of credit as a component in their liquidity 
management and that this is even more evident when looking at firms with higher 
probability of financial distress. Thus, lines of credits are more likely do be viewed as 
cash substitute among firms with low probability of financial distress, high cash flow 
generation and low cash flow volatility. Yun (2009) focus on several corporate 
governance variables when examining what drives firms’ choice between cash and 
lines of credit, concluding that firms under takeover threats prefer lines of credit and 
that firms with lower quality of corporate governance tend to hold cash rather than 
lines of credit. Both studies employ samples including US firms only.  
 
Lins et al. (2010) build on these previous studies, in a survey-based research covering 
29 countries, and find that firms use lines of credit and cash to hedge for different 
risks. Cash provides protection against cash flow shocks in bad times, and lines of 
credit support firms in pursuing investments opportunities in good times. Lins et al. 
(2010) also find that lines of credit are a significant component in firms’ liquidity 
management, in fact it is the primary source. The median line of credit accounts for 
15% of assets, while the median cash holdings amounts to 8-10% of assets. Other 
studies examining the role of credit lines in corporate liquidity management include 
Acharya et al. (2012), Flannery and Lockhart (2009), Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina 
(2009). 
 
Campello et al. (2011) provide new insights on firms’ usage of lines of credit and 
cash by examining how firms manage their liquidity component during the financial 
crisis 2008-2009. The results from their survey-based study comprising firms from 31 
countries suggest that firms substitute between lines of credit and cash when facing 
credit shortage, which is inconsistent with the result of Sufi (2009). The value of lines 
of credit does however decrease with increase in internally generated liquidity.  In 
contrast to the results of Lins et al. (2010), the survey participants state that choices 
regarding cash and lines of credit are made jointly, which enhances the importance of 
including lines of credit in the analysis of corporate liquidity. 
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2.5 Hypotheses Development 
2.5.1 Total Liquidity 
Under the assumption that lines of credit are an important component of firms’ 
liquidity management and should be added to the measure of cash, the hypotheses of 
corporate liquid holdings presented below have been developed. The hypotheses are 
derived from the theoretical predictions of corporate liquidity discussed in sections 
2.2 and 2.3, and are thus interchangeably used in this study when examining 
determinants of cash holdings and total liquidity respectively. Total liquidity is 
defined as cash and marketable securities plus undrawn available amounts under lines 
of credit. Although this study investigates differences in liquidity pre- and post-crisis, 
such differences are difficult to theorize and thus not included in the hypothesis 
below. 
  
2.5.1.1 Growth Opportunities 
Both the transaction cost motive and the precautionary motive suggest that firms with 
larger growth opportunities hold more cash than firms with lower growth 
opportunities. Also the financing hierarchy theory predicts that growth firms hold 
more cash because they are subject to greater information asymmetries, which makes 
external capital expensive (see e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
However, the theory of agency cost of managerial discretion suggest a negative 
relationship because entrenched managers in firms with poor growth opportunities 
hold cash to pursue own objectives. Though this conflict of interest is expected to 
decrease with increased growth opportunities (see e.g. Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007; 
Opler et al., 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Total liquidity is positively related to growth opportunities  
Hypothesis 1b: Total liquidity is negatively related to growth opportunities 
 
2.5.1.2 Firm Size 
Both the precautionary motive and the transaction cost motive predict smaller firms to 
hold more cash than larger firms because they face higher costs of external financing 
and because of economies of scale (see e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 
2004). On the other hand, the financing hierarchy model puts forward that larger firms 
have presumably been able to accumulate cash over time, and should hence hold more 
liquid asset reserves. In addition, larger firms are expected to have larger shareholder 
dispersion, which can give rise to managerial discretion in holding more cash to 
pursue own interests  (see e.g. Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Opler et al., 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Total liquidity is negatively related to firm size 
Hypothesis 2b: Total liquidity is positively related to firm size 
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2.5.1.3 Cash Generation 
A firm with strong internal cash generation should, according to the financing 
hierarchy model, invest its surplus in liquid asset reserves (see e.g. Ferreira & Vilela, 
2004; Opler et al., 1999). A contradicting prediction, according to the transaction cost 
motive, is that the lower the internal cash generation the higher the probability of cash 
shortage and the more liquid asset reserves the firm hold. Or put differently, firms 
with strong cash generation can afford to hold a lower cash buffer (see e.g. Dittmar et 
al., 2002; Kim et al., 1999).  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Total liquidity is positively related to cash generation 
Hypothesis 3b: Total liquidity is negatively related to cash generation 
 
2.5.1.4 Working Capital Intensity / Liquid Asset Substitution 
According to the transaction cost motive, the need for liquid asset reserves decreases 
with the amount of assets that cost-efficiently can be converted into cash (see e.g. 
Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2008; Opler et al., 1999). Since none of the other 
theories explicitly address the impact of assets substitution on cash holdings, only one 
hypothesis is developed.  
 
Hypothesis 4:Total liquidity is negatively related to liquid assets substitution 
 
2.5.1.5 Investment Intensity 
The financing hierarchy model suggests that firms with larger investment outlays 
have less or no surplus from internally generated funds to invest in liquid asset 
reserves, and hence they hold less liquid assets on their balance sheet (see e.g. Bates 
et al., 2009; Opler et al., 1999). On the other hand, liquid asset shortage may be more 
expensive for firms with high investment intensity, which would lead to such firms 
holding more reserves than others according to the transaction cost motive (see e.g. 
Dittmar et al., 2003; Opler et al., 1999).  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Total liquidity is negatively related to investment intensity 
Hypothesis 5b: Total liquidity is positively related to investment intensity 
 
2.5.1.6 Leverage 
The financing hierarchy model suggests a negative relationship between leverage and 
liquidity holdings, because if internally generated funds are not sufficient firms will 
use its liquid reserves before issuing debt, but if the firm has internal surplus it will 
pay down its debt. The theory of agency costs of managerial discretion puts forward 
that firms with low leverage are less subject to monitoring, and that entrenched 
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managers in such firms should hold more cash than others. Further, according to the 
transaction cost motive, highly levered firms face higher costs when investing in 
liquid assets and should hence hold less relative to others (see e.g. Deloof, 2001; 
Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Kim et al., 1998). However, the precautionary view suggests 
that highly levered firms experience higher agency costs of debt and hence hold more 
liquid assets than others. Highly levered firms are also more likely to be constrained 
in raising external funding, again suggesting that they should hold liquid asset 
reserves for precautionary reasons (see e.g. Guney et al., 2007; Opler et al., 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Total liquidity is negatively related to leverage 
Hypothesis 6b: Total liquidity is positively related to leverage 
 
2.5.1.7 Debt Maturity 
Firms with larger portions of short-term debt are assumed to face greater refinancing 
risk and hence hold more cash for precautionary reasons to compensate for this. It is 
also expected that firms with higher information asymmetries keep more short-term 
debt, again suggesting a negative relation between debt maturity and liquid asset 
holdings, where debt maturity is defined as portion of long-term debt over total debt 
(see e.g. Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-Solano, 2008). 
 
Hypothesis 7: Total liquidity is negatively related to debt maturity (long-term debt to 
total debt) 
 
2.5.1.8 R&D Intensity 
Given the information asymmetries associated with R&D expenditures, R&D 
intensive firms are expected to hold more liquid asset reserves for precautionary 
reasons. In addition, the transaction cost motive suggests that when external financing 
is expensive firms hold more cash. Given the low asset tangibility of R&D-related 
assets, it is expected to be costly for firms to finance R&D investments with external 
capital, hence, R&D intensive firms should hold more cash (see e.g. Bates et al., 
2009; Opler et al., 1999). On the other hand, R&D intensive firms are assumed to 
consume its internal surplus and accumulate less liquid assets, in line with the 
financing hierarchy model (see e.g. Bates et al., 2009; Opler et al., 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 8a: Total liquidity is positively related to R&D intensity 
Hypothesis 8b: Total liquidity is negatively related to R&D intensity 
 
2.5.1.9 Probability of Default 
The transaction cost motive predicts a positive relation between liquid asset holdings 
and the probability of default of a firms, because firms with lower probability of 
default typically face lower transaction costs. Firms in financial distress might in 
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addition try to increase their liquid asset reserves as a precautionary reason to reduce 
the default risk (see e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). On the other hand, 
a plausible interpretation can be that firms in financial distress are simply less likely 
to hold liquidity reserves due to their economic condition (see e.g. Kim et al., 1998). 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Total liquidity is positively related to the probability of default 
Hypothesis 9b: Total liquidity is negatively related to probability of default 
 
2.5.1.10 Cash Flow Volatility 
The precautionary motive expects firms with more volatile cash flows to hold more 
cash. In addition, as the probability of liquid asset shortage increases with cash flow 
volatility a positive relationship is predicted by the transaction cost motive as well 
(see e.g. Bates et al., 2009; Opler et al., 1999).  
 
Hypothesis 10: Total liquidity is positively related to cash flow volatility 
 
2.5.1.11 Seasonality 
As with predictions made with regards to cash flow volatility, one could argue in line 
with the precautionary motive that seasonality, the systematic volatility in cash flows 
within a year, should be positively related to liquid holdings. To minimize the risk of 
liquidity shortage during the year, more seasonal firms would thus hold more liquid 
assets to manage larger deviations in working capital and inventories during the year 
(see e.g. Sufi, 2009). 
 
Hypothesis 11: Total liquidity is positively related to seasonality 
 
2.5.1.12 Dividends 
The transaction cost motive puts forward that cutting dividends is a cost-efficient way 
of accessing capital and therefore it can be expected that dividend-paying firms hold 
less liquid asset reserves. The financing hierarchy model also suggests a negative 
relationship because dividends decrease the available surplus for liquid asset 
investments (see e.g. Dittmar et al., 2003; Opler et al., 1999). 
  
Hypothesis 12: Total liquidity is negatively related to dividends 
 
 
2.5.2 The Relationship Between Lines of Credit and Cash 
Assuming that the theoretical motives of using lines of credit as opposed to cash (or 
vice versa) are not perfectly aligned, the following hypotheses have been developed in 
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order to investigate the determinants of firms’ choice between the two sources of 
corporate liquidity. 
 
2.5.2.1 Growth Opportunities 
To the extent that growth firms experience larger information asymmetries, firms with 
larger growth opportunities are expected to use less lines of credit, following the idea 
that such firms hold less debt in general (see e.g. Sufi, 2009). On the other hand, it 
can be argued that firms with more promising growth opportunities are expected to 
experience more favorable covenants compared to firms with less promising growth 
opportunities. Such firms are more likely to view lines of credit as a cash equivalent 
and thus rely less on cash (see e.g. Demiroglu & James, 2010). 
 
Hypothesis A1: Lines of credit are negatively related to growth opportunities 
Hypothesis A2: Lines of credit are positively related to growth opportunities 
 
2.5.2.2 Firm Size 
Larger firms are expected to both have better access to lines of credit and enjoy more 
favorable covenants due to the increasing transparency associated with firm size. 
Such firms are hence expected to benefit more from the advantages with external 
financing, and also lines of credit, compared to smaller firms (see e.g. Demiroglu & 
James, 2010; Sufi, 2009). Entrenched management is however expected to prefer cash 
to lines of credit. To the extent that larger firms have larger shareholder dispersion, 
which can give rise to managerial discretion, a plausible interpretation is thus that 
lines of credit is negatively related to firm size (see e.g. Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Yun, 
2009).  
 
Hypothesis B1: Lines of credit are positively related to firm size 
Hypothesis B2: Lines of credit are negatively related to firm size 
 
2.5.2.3 Cash Generation 
Firms with strong internal cash generation are less limited by the financial covenants 
associated with lines of credit and more likely benefit from the advantages it provides. 
Hence, firms with stronger internal cash generation rely on lines to a greater extent 
compared to firms with weaker internal cash generation (see e.g. Sufi, 2009). 
 
Hypothesis C: Lines of credit are positively related to cash generation 
 
2.5.2.4 Working Capital Intensity / Borrowing Base 
The borrowing base ties the available credit to the value of a specific collateral, often 
accounts receivable or inventory. Hence, firms with a greater amount of working 
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capital are expected to have access to greater amounts of lines of credit (see e.g. 
Demiroglu & James, 2011; Flannery & Wang, 2011). 
 
Hypothesis D: Lines of credit are positively related to borrowing base 
 
2.5.2.5 Investment Intensity 
Theoretically there is no indication on how the level of capital expenditures affects 
the relationship between cash and lines of credit. The difficulty lies in predicting the 
role of cash and lines of credit within firms’ liquidity management with regards to 
operational and ongoing funding versus expansionary funding, thus no hypothesis has 
been developed. 
 
No hypothesis with regards to lines of credit’s relatedness to investment intensity 
 
2.5.2.6 Leverage 
To the extent that low leverage, and thus lower capital market monitoring, increases 
the possibility of opportunistic management, it is expected that low-levered firms 
prefer less monitoring and will rely on cash as opposed to lines of credit (see previous 
discussion on agency costs of managerial discretion, and e.g. Yun, 2009). 
 
Hypothesis E: Lines of credit are positively related to leverage 
 
2.5.2.7 Debt Maturity 
The impact of debt maturity on the use of lines of credit as opposed to cash has, to the 
best of knowledge, not been covered in previous theories or literature. This results in 
no hypothesis having been developed with regards to expected outcome. 
 
No hypothesis with regards to lines of credit’s relatedness to debt maturity 
 
2.5.2.8 R&D Intensity 
As with debt maturity, there are no clear theoretical indications as to how R&D 
intensity affects the use of lines of credit as opposed to cash. However, following the 
discussion above on the effect of R&D intensity on total liquidity, information 
asymmetries associated with R&D expenditures are expected to make external 
financing more expensive, and thus would R&D intensive firms hold proportionally 
more cash than lines of credit.  
 
Hypothesis F: Lines of credit are negatively related to R&D intensity 
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2.5.2.9 Probability of Default 
Firms with poor credit quality are expected to be more limited in their access to lines 
of credit, and if accessing lines of credit more likely to face tighter covenants. It is 
therefore expected that lines of credit are negatively related to the probability of 
default, since firms closer to distress will prefer cash (see e.g. Demiroglu et al., 2009; 
Demiroglu and James, 2010). 
 
Hypothesis G: Lines of credit are negatively related to the probability of default 
 
2.5.2.10 Cash Flow Volatility 
Firms with larger variability in cash flows, thus riskier, should find lines of credit less 
valuable compared to firms with more stable cash flows. More volatile firms, are 
hence expected to hold less lines of credit, in order to avoid less favorable covenants 
that commonly are cash flow based (see e.g. Sufi, 2009). On the other hand, firms 
with relatively more volatile cash flows are expected to find lines of credit a useful 
source of financing to secure future investment opportunities in times when internally 
generated funds are insufficient (see e.g. Sufi (2009).  
 
Hypothesis H1: Lines of credit are negatively related to cash flow volatility 
Hypothesis H2: Lines of credit are positively related to cash flow volatility 
 
2.5.2.11 Seasonality 
Similar to firms with volatile cash flows can seasonal firms be expected to hold less 
lines of credit due to potentially less favorable credit terms compared to less seasonal 
firms. On the other hand, firms with larger intra-year fluctuations in sales or cash 
flows can be expected to value the flexibility of lines of credit and make greater use 
of lines of credit to temporarily manage fluctuations in for example working capital 
and inventories (see e.g. Sufi, 2009). 
 
Hypothesis I1: Lines of credit are negatively related to seasonality 
Hypothesis I2: Lines of credit are positively related to seasonality 
 
2.5.2.12 Dividends 
Dividend-paying firms are less likely to view lines of credit as a cash substitute 
because loan agreements typically restrict dividend payments in breach of covenants. 
Such firms are more likely to choose cash over lines of credit in their liquidity 
management (see e.g. Lins et al, 2010; Nini et al., 2009; Sufi, 2009).  
 
Hypothesis J: Lines of credit are negatively related to dividends 
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Table 2.3 – Summary of Hypothesized Impact of Independent Variables on Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected sign Hypothesis Expected sign Hypothesis
Growth Opportunities + 1a - A1
- 1b + A2
Firm Size - 2a + B1
+ 2b - B2
Cash Generation + 3a + C
- 3b
Working Capital Intensity - 4 + D
Investment Intensity - 5a
+ 5b
Leverage - 6a + E
+ 6b
Debt Maturity - 7
R&D Intensity + 8a - F
- 8b
Probability of Default + 9a - G
- 9b
Cash Flow Volatility + 10 - H1
+ H2
Seasonality + 11 - I1
+ I2
Dividend - 12 - J
Summary of hypothesized relationship between dependent independent variables
Lines of Credit Total Liquidity
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 3 Methodology 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
To empirically investigate the determinants of corporate liquidity in Swedish firms 
this study employs a deductive approach using existing theories to form the basis for 
the research methodology (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). In order to examine 
how Swedish listed firms manage their liquidity three sets of regressions are carried 
out. (1) The first set of regressions aims at investigating cash holdings (cash and 
marketable securities) during the entire period 2007-2011, in order to enable a 
comparison with previous studies covering other markets. (2) The second set of 
regressions will then look at total liquidity, adding total undrawn lines of credit to the 
measure of cash holdings. Adding lines of credit is critical in order to fully understand 
the field of corporate liquidity management, as discussed previously. For the second 
set of regressions, a sub sample of two years out of the total time period is chosen, 
2007 and 2011 respectively. The two-year approach is motivated in several ways. 
Firstly, 2007 and 2011 enables a comparison of total liquidity pre- and post-crisis, i.e. 
present4 . Secondly, since information on lines of credit needs to be collected 
manually, collecting data for the entire period is outside the time scope of this paper. 
The second set of regressions will then also look into the relationship between cash 
and lines of credit. (3) As a final step, the third set of regressions applies an 
alternative definition of liquidity on the 2007 and 2011 sub sample, a measure 
commonly used by practitioners within the field of liquidity management. The 
definition is based on that used S&P in their liquidity assessment of firms, and 
incorporates present and future projected liquidity sources and uses.  
 
3.2 Data 
This study will analyze all Swedish primarily listed firms on the Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm Small-, Mid- and Large Cap lists during 2007-2011. Any information 
regarding changes to the lists, such as new listings or de-listings are collected 
manually from the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm homepage (NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., 
u.d.). By also including the firms that have been listed and/or delisted during the 
period, the effect of survivorship bias in the sample is minimized. Any changes 
between the Small-, Mid- and Large Cap are not accounted for. 
 
3.2.1 Data Collection 
The data is collected from the annual reports using the Bloomberg Database, 
including any information required for data sampling. As mentioned previously, data 
                                                
4 Although one could argue that 2012 would have been favorable to use, complete data of the corporate 
accounts has not been made available for a majority of the sample at the time of this study. 
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regarding lines of credit is collected manually. The published annual reports for 2007 
and 2009 are primarily downloaded from each company’s homepage, and if reports 
are not readily available the reports are instead downloaded from the Bolagverket 
(Swedish Companies Registration Office) records.  
 
When collecting information regarding the lines of credit, the following search 
criteria are used: (1) Line(s) of credit, (2) credit line(s), (3) facility/facilities, (4) 
overdraft, (5) credit agreement, (6) liquidity, (7) liquidity risk, (8) financing risk (9) 
(un)utilized, (10) (un)used. These search criteria will thus also capture revolving 
credit facilities, working capital facilities, bank facilities, standby letters of credit, 
back up facilities etc. In case of only Swedish reports being available the following 
criteria are used: (1) checkkredit, (2) checkräkningskredit, (3) facilitet(er), (4) 
kreditram, (5) kreditlöfte(n), (6) likviditet, (7) likviditetsrisk, (8) finansieringsrisk, (9) 
(o)utnyttjad, (10) tillgänglig. The lack of standardized information presented in the 
annual reports with regards to the commitment of the lines of credit, makes it difficult 
to draw valid conclusions of whether the lines of credit are committed or 
uncommitted. The search criteria are thus set up to capture total undrawn amounts 
under all credit lines, i.e. no difference is made with regards to the nature of the 
credits, in line with Sufi (2009). For a discussion as to how including all lines of 
credit affects this study, please see in 3.5. 
  
3.2.2 Data Sampling 
In order for a firm to be included in the sample, the company has to have been 
primarily listed for the entire year. The year in which a company is listed or delisted is 
thus excluded if one or both has occurred during 2007-2011. This criterion is added to 
avoid including incomplete and distorted data from the annual accounts, which would 
yield misleading results. 
 
In addition to the requirement of primary listing on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
Small-, Mid- and Large Cap lists during 2007-2011, only firm observations fulfilling 
the following criteria are included: 
 
i. Classified as ICB (Industry Classification Benchmark) code 1-7000 or 9000, 
i.e. financials (ICB Industry Code 8000) are excluded. Banks and financials 
are excluded since cash and marketable securities are part of such firm’s 
business, but also due to effects of regulatory capital requirements on capital 
structure (Opler et al., 1999) 
ii. Report in SEK 
iii. Domicile Sweden 
iv. Report in line with the IAS/IFRS accounting standard 
v. Complete data available for all variables 
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It is generally important to minimizing the effect of outliers, especially in studies such 
as this one where an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is used. Since the OLS 
estimator minimizes the sum of the squared residuals, equally weighting each 
observation, it can be very vulnerable to extreme values. Large residuals, positive or 
negative, are thus given a substantial weight (Wooldridge, 2006). However, there are 
no clear indications of extensive outlier effects within the sample, when studying the 
distribution statistically or graphically. The data set has thus not been winsorized, in 
order to conserve as many observations as possible, which is of particular importance 
in the subsample used in the second and third set of regressions. Please see 4.1.1.1 
and 4.1.2.1 for statistics and distribution of the included variables. The use of OLS in 
this study is further explained in section 3.4.  
 
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Final Sample 
Total number of primarily listed firms on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during 2007-
2011 amounted to 317, of which 26 were listed during the period, 44 were delisted 
during the period, and 247 were listed throughout the entire period. Out of the initial 
317 firms, 16 were removed due to not being listed for an entire fiscal year 2007-
2011. The sample was further reduced by 56 financial firms (ICB 8000), 21 firms that 
did not have Sweden as domicile or reported in another currency than SEK, and 6 
firms that did not report in line with IAS/IFRS. Out of the remaining 218 firms were 
55 firms removed due to incomplete data for one or more variables. The final sample 
(included in the first set of regressions) comprised 163 firms and 567 firm year 
observations throughout the period 2007-2011. Descriptive data of the total sample, 
including industry classification and dividend frequency, is presented in table 3.1 
below. 
 
Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics of Total Sample 
 
 
For the second and third set of regressions the total sample was sorted into a 
subsample of the 2007 and 2011 firm observations. The subsample was reduced from 
Total sample 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL
ICB 1000 - Basic Materials 5 7 6 5 5 28
ICB 2000 - Industrials 47 46 52 60 63 268
ICB 3000 - Consumer Goods 13 15 16 12 12 68
ICB 4000 - Health Care 13 12 14 14 14 67
ICB 5000 - Consumer Services 16 14 11 10 9 60
ICB 6000 - Telecommunications 2 1 1 1 1 6
ICB 7000 - Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0
ICB 9000 - Technology 26 22 22 15 13 98
Number of dividend-paying observations 82 72 69 77 75 375
Number of observations 122 117 122 107 99 567
Total number of cross-sections in sample 122 117 122 107 99 163
Number of firm observations in the total sample 2007-2009 and in total by industry classification and dividend-payment.
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the initial 221 firm observations, to 197, due to data unavailability mainly associated 
with lines of credit. The final subsample comprised 133 firms and 197 firm 
observations. Descriptive data of the subsample, including industry classification and 
dividend frequency, is presented in table 3.2 below. For a list of the specific 
companies included in the total sample as well as the subsample, please see Appendix 
A. 
 
Table 3.2 - Descriptive statistics of subsample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables in the Three Regressions Sets 
In order to be able to both conduct a comparison with previous studies, as well as 
shed more light on the field of liquidity management, liquidity will be defined in three 
different ways. 
 
The First Set of Regressions (2007-2011 sample) 
In order to enable a comparison with previous studies on cash holdings, cash (CASH) 
is defined as cash and marketable securities, to book value of total assets less cash and 
marketable securities (hereon after referred to as net assets). The measure is in line 
with the definition used by e.g. Opler et al. (1999), Drobetz and Gruninger (2007), 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004). This study chooses to remove cash and marketable 
securities from total assets in order to isolate the portion of cash to non-cash assets. 
 
CASH = Cash&Marketable SecuritiesNet Assets (1)
 
 
 
Subsample 2007 2011 Total
ICB 1000 - Basic Materials 4 5 9
ICB 2000 - Industrials 40 42 82
ICB 3000 - Consumer Goods 12 9 21
ICB 4000 - Health Care 10 14 24
ICB 5000 - Consumer Services 16 9 25
ICB 6000 - Telecommunications 2 1 3
ICB 7000 - Utilities 0 0 0
ICB 9000 - Technology 21 12 33
Number of dividend-paying observations 71 70 141
Number of observations 105 92 197
Number of cross-sections in subsample 105 92 133
Number of firm observations in the subsample 2007, 2009 and in total by industry classification and
dividend-payment.
 33 
The Second Set of Regressions (2007 and 2011 subsample) 
As a development of previous measurements, the definition of total liquidity 
(LIQUIDITY) adds total undrawn lines of credit to cash and marketable securities 
that are traditionally excluded, despite being proven to represents a substantial portion 
of corporate liquidity, as previously mentioned. 
 
LIQUIDITY = Cash&Marketable Securities + Lines of CreditNet Assets (2)
 
 
The second set of regressions will further investigate the relationship between cash 
(CASH) and lines of credit (LOC), as well as the determinants of firms’ use of lines 
of credit as opposed to cash (and vice versa). This is done by first regressing cash 
holdings as a dependent variable, in line with the definition in the first set of 
regressions, also including lines of credit to net assets as one of the independent 
variables (referred to as regression 2.2). Secondly, to find determinants behind the use 
of lines of credit in comparison to cash, lines of credit (LOC) to the sum of cash and 
lines of credit (CASH + LOC) is regressed as the dependent variable together with the 
independent variables discussed below (referred to as regression 2.3). 
 
The Third Set of Regressions (2007 and 2011 subsample) 
This last definition is strongly influenced by the measure used by Standard & Poor’s, 
and is a forward looking cash flow measure of liquidity (LIQUIDITY RATIO). One 
modification is made with regards to the measurement of lines of credit, where the 
total undrawn amount rather than undrawn committed amount only is included. The 
reason behind this slight adjustment is the lack of information presented in the annual 
reports with regards to the commitment of the lines of credit, as discussed in 3.2.1. 
This third measure is included in order to investigate whether the definition 
commonly used by practitioners, yields a stronger explanatory power as to the 
determinants of corporate liquidity. The definition is measured as a ratio of firms’ 
liquidity sources to liquidity uses, incorporating both present and future (short-term) 
projected liquidity, as shown below: 
 
LIQUIDITY RATIO = Cash&Marketable Securitiest +Op CFt+1(if positive)+ NWCt+1 (if positive)+Undrawn LoCtCapExt+1 +Op CFt+1(if negative)+ NWCt+1 (if negative)+ S − t Debtt + Divt+1
"
#
$
%
&
' (3)
 
 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Based on the hypotheses development in section 2.5, a set of independent variables 
are included to investigate determinants of liquidity management of Swedish firms 
2007-2011. All variables are calculated using annual data unless otherwise stated. 
Nominal values are used for all measures of dependent and independent variables. For 
detailed calculations of the variables including the Bloomberg functions (mnemonics) 
used, please see Appendix B. 
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Growth opportunities are include to capture the theoretical aspect that growth firms 
face greater information asymmetries and greater costs of liquidity shortfalls, which is 
expected to affect amount of total liquidity. As a proxy for growth opportunities 
(M/B) this study uses the market-to-book ratio, calculated as book value of total 
assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity less cash, divided by net 
assets. This definition is equal to the definition used by Sufi (2009), who, as opposed 
to Bates et al. (1995) and Dittmar et al. (2003), Opler et al. (1999), removes cash from 
the nominator as well as denominator. As with the definition of the dependent 
variable, which is scaled by net asset (see 3.3.1), it is important to also clear assets 
from cash in the independent variables in order to isolate from effects of cash 
holdings. In addition, expressing the independent variables similarly is preferred in 
order to enhance comparison of the results.  
 
Firm size (SIZE) is included as a proxy for access to capital markets, cost of external 
financing, and shareholder dispersion. The variable is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets. Although not reported, the natural 
logarithm of net assets was also calculated. This alternative measure did not affect the 
results in any material way and was thus excluded. Measuring size as the natural 
logarithm of the book value of assets is in line with Drobetz and Gruninger (2007) 
and Garcia-Teruel and Marinez-Solano (2008). 
 
Cash generation (OP CF) is included to proxy for firms’ ability to accumulate cash, 
as well as the probability of cash shortage. The variable is measured differently when 
comparing across previous studies. For example, Opler et al. (1999) uses earnings 
after interest, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation to net assets, Dittmar et al. 
(2003) defines it as EBITDA less interest payments, taxes and dividends to net assets, 
Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) calculates pre-tax profits plus depreciation divided by total 
assets, while Drobetz & Gruninger (2007) uses operating cash flow to total assets. 
When collecting data for this study, two measures were initially calculated. Firstly 
cash flow was proxied using an earnings-based measure similar to that used by Ozkan 
& Ozkan (2004), and secondly cash flow was calculated as operating cash flow to net 
assets. Since the first proxy had significantly worse data availability and since it is an 
accounting based proxy for true cash flow generation, the second cash flow measure 
is chosen.  
 
In order to account for differences in liquid assets substitution (referred to as 
borrowing base in regression 2.3) (NWC) among firms, net working capital to net 
assets is included in the regression. Net working capital is calculated as current assets 
minus current liabilities less cash to net assets. This definition does not vary much 
looking at previous research, however is often measured as a ratio of total assets 
rather than net assets (see e.g., Bates et al., 2009; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Opler et al., 
1999). Again, this study chooses to look at net assets to isolate the measure from 
effects of cash holdings as previously discussed. 
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An investment intense firm consumes more cash and would, ceteris paribus, 
accumulate less cash. However, the cost of cash shortage is greater for investment 
intensive firms, which implies a greater need for cash reserves. In order to capture and 
investigate the effect of investment intensity (CAPEX) on liquid holdings, capital 
expenditures as a ratio of net assets is calculated. This definition is in line with Bates 
et al. (2009) and Opler et al. (1999), although scaled by net assets instead of total 
assets.  
 
Leverage (LEV) is measured as total debt over total asset, and equals the definition 
used by Drobetz and Gruninger (2007), Dittmar et al. (2003), Opler et al. (1999) and 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), to mention a few. The variable is included not only to 
investigate what impact the amount of debt has on firms liquidity reserves, but also to 
proxy for the level of capital market monitoring the firm is subject to and potential 
problems with agency cost of debt, all which are expected to affect the amount of 
liquidity firms hold. As with firm size, an alternative measure of leverage was 
calculated using net assets as a denominator. The alternative measure of leverage did 
not affect the conclusions in any substantial way, and is thus not reported.  
 
For R&D intensity, previous studies e.g., Drobetz and Gruninger (2007) and Opler et 
al. (1999), have used R&D expenses over sales. Bates et al. (2009) use R&D to sales 
as well as R&D to assets but find no differences between the two variables. In these 
previous studies R&D is assumed to be zero if no information is given. This is a risky 
assumption since R&D is not reported unanimously across companies, but could be 
expensed together with other items in the income statement. This study chooses to 
capture firms’ use of R&D by instead looking at the amount of intangible assets a 
firm holds on its balance sheet. R&D intensity (R&D) is calculated as book value of 
total assets less tangible assets less goodwill to net assets. This definition improves 
the measurement by avoiding faulty assumptions regarding the presence of R&D 
within Swedish firms, at the same time capturing the intensity in which firms invest 
(organically since goodwill is excluded) in their intangible assets. The R&D intensity 
variable is related to several of the factors that are expected to affect the liquidity 
holdings of firms, such as information asymmetries and asset tangibility.  
 
Following Drobetz and Gruninger (2007), Kim et al. (1998) and Sufi (2009), this 
study aims to employ a measure for probability of default. Previous studies are 
somewhat inconsistent in the definition of such measurement. Drobetz and Gruninger 
(2007) and Kim et al. (1998) use the inverse of Altman’s (1968) Z-score, but exclude 
the working capital component to avoid circularity with the dependent variable cash. 
Sufi (2009) also uses an adjusted version of Altman’s Z-score but excludes the 
leverage component and includes the working capital component, again to avoid 
circularity with the dependent variable. Other studies, e.g., Bates et al. (2009) and 
Opler et al. (1999), choose to instead proxy for the cost of financial distress using 
other variables and suggests that firms with, for example high market-to-book value, 
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high R&D expenditures and high capital expenditures experience higher costs of 
financial distress.  
 
This study recognizes that the Z-score may not efficiently explain the potential 
relationship between the financial health of a firm and its liquidity management, 
because of the highlighted problems with circularity. However, the natural logarithm 
of Altman’s Z-score is included to proxy for probability of default (ZSCORE), in an 
attempt to capture the desired information regarding firms’ financial health. Using the 
natural logarithm of the Altman’s Z-score is needed in order to compress the 
relatively large standard deviation of the variable. The effect on Altman’s Z-score on 
the results is further discussed in 4.2.1. 
 
ZSCORE = ln 1.2×Working CapitalTotal Assets
"
#
$ +1.4× Retained EarningsTotal Assets +3.3×
EBIT
Total Assets + 0.6×
MV Equity
Total Assets +1.0×
Sales
Total Assets
%
&
' (4)
 
 
Debt maturity (LT DEBT) is measured as the portion of long-term debt to total debt, 
and is in line with the definition used by Ferreira & Vilela (2004) and García-Teruel 
& Martínez-Solano (2008). The variable captures the debt structure of a firm, and can 
proxy for refinancing risk as well as level of information asymmetry, all which may 
have an impact on the level of liquidity. 
 
Cash flow volatility (CF VOL) is defined as the standard deviation of operating cash 
flow to net assets for the previous ten years, requiring a minimum of three 
consecutive observations. The variable aims to capture the probability of cash 
shortage, which affects the need for liquid assets reserves. The definition is similar to 
that used by Bates et al. (2009) and Opler et al. (1999), with the modification of using 
net assets as opposed to total assets. Also Bates et al. (2009) and Opler et al. (1999) 
average the cash flow standard deviation each year across industries. Since the sample 
in this study does not yield a substantial number of firms in each industry category 
(see table 3.1 and 3.2), volatility is not calculated across specific industries but rather 
across each firm individually.  
 
As an additional input to the field of liquidity management, this study includes a 
measure of seasonality (SEASON). Seasonality is calculated as the yearly standard 
deviation in operating cash flow to net assets using quarterly data. This measure 
attempts to account for quarterly fluctuations in cash flow during a given year, that is 
not truly captured looking at the instantaneous end of year accounts. Firms with larger 
quarterly fluctuations are expected to hold more security in form of cash (and lines of 
credit) in order to handle the risk of liquidity shortage during the lower quarters. 
Although Sufi (2009) tries to capture the effect of seasonality by including the 
standard deviation in sales for firms within a given industry, this measure does not 
incorporate seasonality effects apprehended to actual cash flows. A firm may 
experience seasonality effects in cash inflows, such as sales, but may also be exposed 
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to seasonal (operating) cash outflows. Using operating cash flow rather than sales 
captures both of these effects, and removes the risk of accounting based measures that 
do not correspond to actual cash generation, as with the cash flow volatility measure. 
Seasonality is not calculated per industry classification for the same reason as 
presented in previous measure of cash flow volatility. 
 
Lastly, lines of credit (LOC) are included in the second set of regressions as an 
independent variable, calculated as the total undrawn amounts under all reported lines 
of credit to net asset. Since lines of credit are a form of pre-negotiated liquidity and 
have been proven to constitute a substantial part of firms’ liquidity management and 
corporate funding (see e.g, Jiménez et al., 2009; Lins et al., 2010; Sufi, 2009), lines of 
credit are expected to have a negative relationship to the level of cash holdings, 
although the degree of substitutionality may differ among firms of different 
characteristics. 
 
3.3.3 Dummy Variables 
This study will also look at the effect of industry classification and dividend payment 
using a set of dummy variables. The dividend dummy (DIV) will equal 1 if dividends 
have been paid out and 0 if no dividends have been paid out during the year. The 
different industries will be captured using six dummy variables set to cover the ICB 
Industries (Industry Classification Benchmark) on a one-digit level. Since none of the 
firms in the sample were classified as ICB 7000, and since ICB 8000 is excluded 
according to the sampling criteria in 3.2.2, only 7 categories remain. The one-digit 
ICB code level is chosen to gain sufficient number of firms within each industry 
classification (for information regarding the industry classification of the firms in the 
sample, please see table 3.1 and 3.2). 
  
3.4 Regression Techniques 
A multiple regression model investigates the relationship between the dependent 
variable and a set of independent variable and whether the behavior in the dependent 
variable can be explained by the behavior of the independent variables (Brooks, 
2008). Using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation model, this study aims to 
empirically investigate the relationship between the variables presented above. 
Whether the coefficients generated using the OLS estimation model describe the true 
relationship or not depends on the assumptions made regarding the distribution of the 
error term and its relation to the variables (Verbeek, 2012). In order to determine 
whether the OLS coefficient estimates in this study are valid, all regressions are 
controlled for the six assumptions of the multiple linear regression model. The results 
of these diagnostic tests are discussed in 4.2.1. The six assumptions are as follows: 
 
i. The regression model is linear in the parameters and correctly specified 
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ii. The error term and the independent variables are uncorrelated, i.e. the 
independent variables are non-stochastic 
iii. The error term has a zero mean value 
iv. The error term has a constant variance, i.e. the error terms are homoscedastic 
v. The error terms are uncorrelated with one another, i.e. no autocorrelation 
exists between the error terms 
vi. No exact linear relationships between the independent variables exist, i.e. no 
exact collinearity exists. (Gujarati & Porter, 2010) 
 
3.4.1 The First Set of Regressions – Multiple Regression on Panel Data 
Since the first set of regressions differs in that it incorporates the entire time period, 
the methodological approach will differ somewhat in this set compared to the other 
two sets due to the impact of panel data. Panel data arises when the data set includes 
cross-sectional observations as well as times-series observations (Brooks, 2008). The 
sample on which the first set of regressions is carried out includes 163 firms over a 
five-year period 2007-2011, totaling 567 observations of dependent and independent 
variables. There are several advantages when using panel data, much due to its rich 
information set over both time and space. Compared to simple time-series or cross 
sectional data, panel data enables addressing a wider range of problems increasing the 
ability to estimate more complex and realistic models (Verbeek, 2012). Further panel 
data yields several advantages by reducing the need for a longer period of data, at the 
same time as a sufficient number of observations are attained (Brooks, 2008). When 
looking at the relatively short time period 2007-2011, combining cross-sectional and 
time series data is therefore favorable, due to an increase in degrees of freedom and 
therefore power of the tests to be conducted.  
 
The standard linear regression model for panel data can be written as: 
 
yi,t =α + βxi,t + εi,t (5)  
 
where i is the index for the cross-sectional units and t is the index for the time periods 
(Brooks, 2008). 
 
Panel data can either be balanced or unbalanced. Balanced panel data consist of an 
equal number of times-series observations for all cross-sectional units, whereas 
unbalanced data may have different amount of observations for each cross-sectional 
unit (Brooks, 2008). The sample used in this study is unbalance, as it is not required 
that all cross-sectional units have observations for the full period, only to have full 
information for all variables for each observation. Since the econometric software5 
automatically handles the unbalanced nature of our sample, no implications on the 
result are expected. 
                                                
5 The econometric software used in this study is Eviews 7. 
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Following assumption (ii) and (v), the multiple linear regression model assumes that 
there is no correlation between the error terms and the independent variables, and no 
correlation between the error terms from different periods. However, these 
assumptions may not be realistic in a panel data set, which may result in the routinely 
computed standard errors for OLS being misleading (Verbeek, 2012). Firstly, given 
that the same cross-sectional unit is observed repeatedly over time there may exist 
correlation between its error terms (Verbeek, 2012). Secondly, one might suspect that 
there in fact is dependence between the independent variables chosen in the sample, 
i.e. they are not exogenous, as one firm-specific characteristic may depend on 
another. To address such problems, error component models should be incorporated 
as they typically lead to more efficient coefficient estimates than the standard OLS 
(Verbeek, 2012).  
 
Two models of interest are the random effects model and the fixed effects model. 
Using a Hausman test one can control whether random effects are necessary for the 
specific panel data set. The random effects model decomposes the error term and adds 
one component to the individual observation’s error term that captures the random 
deviation of each cross-sectional unit from a common intercept, which is constant in 
both data dimensions. Similarly, using a fixed effects redundant likelihood ratio test 
one can control whether fixed effects are necessary for the specific data set. The fixed 
effects model decompose the error term into one component that captures all the 
observations that affect the dependent variable cross-sectionally but are constant over 
time, and one component that captures what is left unexplained about the dependent 
variable, i.e. cross-sectional fixed effects (Brooks, 2008). If the average value of the 
dependent variable varies over time, but not over cross-sections the model adds an 
intercept, which is allowed to vary over time but stays constant over cross-sections. 
This in order to capture the effects that impact the dependent variable over time (but 
are constant over cross-sections), i.e. time-series fixed effects (ibid.). 
 
The first set of regressions is constructed as follows: 
 
Reg1.1[ ] CASHi,t =α +β1M / Bi,t +β2SIZEi,t +β3OP CFi,t +β4NWCi,t +β5CAPEXi,t +β6LEVi,t + (6)
β7LT DEBTi,t +β8R&Di,t +β9CF VOLi,t +β10SEASONi,t +β11DIVi,t +εi,t
 
 
3.4.2 The Second and Third Set of Regressions – Multiple Regression 
Using Cross-Sectional Data 
The second and third set of regression are carried out on a subsample and incorporates 
data on lines of credit. As mentioned, the subsample consists of 105 cross-sectional 
units for 2007 and 92 for 2011, totaling 197 observations. Although consisting of 
observation from two different time periods, the second and the third set of 
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regressions will apply the standard OLS on a cross-sectional data set. In order to 
analyze the potential difference between the two years 2007 and 2011, representing 
pre- and post-crisis, intercept and slope dummy variables are used (although not 
expressed in the regressions definitions shown below).  
 
 
The second set of regressions is constructed as follows: 
 
Reg 2.1[ ] LIQUIDITYi =α +β1M / Bi +β2SIZEi +β3OP CFi +β4NWCi +β5CAPEXi +β6LEVi + (7)
β7LT DEBTi +β8R&Di +β9CF VOLi +β10SEASONi +β11DIVi +εi
 
 
Reg 2.2[ ] CASHi =α +β1LOCi +β2M / Bi +β3SIZE +β4OP CFi +β5NWCi +β6CAPEXi +β7LEVi + (8)
β8LT DEBTi +β9R&Di +β10CF VOLi +β11SEASONi +β12DIVi +εi
 
 
Reg 2.3[ ] CASHiCASHi + LOCi
=α +β1M / Bi +β2SIZEi +β3OP CFi +β4NWCi +β5CAPEXi +β6LEVi + (9)
β7LT DEBTi +β8R&Di +β9CF VOLi +β10SEASONi +β11DIVi +εi
 
 
 
The third set of regression is constructed as follows: 
 
Reg 3.1[ ] LIQUIDITY RATIOi =α +β1M / Bi +β2SIZEi +β3OP CFi +β4NWCi +β5CAPEXi +β6LEVi + (10)
β7LT DEBTi +β8R&Di +β9CF VOLi +β10SEASONi +β11DIVi +εi
 
 
3.5 Methodological Criticism and Measurement Issues 
Although the methodological approach has been constructed and carried out to 
minimize incorrectly inferred results, it is important to revise the method by 
addressing several aspects that may have negative influenced its quality. Since data 
collection involves both secondary data from the Bloomberg database as well as 
primary data on lines of credit, there may exist inconsistencies between the two data 
types, especially with regards to standardization. Bloomberg consistently defines each 
data component in a standard format, in order to enhance comparability across firms 
and time periods. When collecting data on lines of credit manually, it is difficult to 
ensure such consistency and completely eliminate mistakes, although mistakes have 
been minimized through the use of the previously listed search criteria.  
 
It is not entirely unproblematic to collect data on lines of credit when no formal 
requirements on disclosure of such information exist. However, IAS 17, which is the 
accounting standard that regulates the historical changes in cash and cash equivalents 
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as well as the definition of cash and cash equivalents, encourages firms to disclose 
additional information that “may be relevant to users in understanding the financial 
position and liquidity of an entity. Disclosure of this information [...] may include: (a) 
the amount of undrawn borrowing facilities that may be available for future operating 
activities and to settle capital commitments, indicating any restrictions on the use of 
these facilities” (IAS 17, §50-50a). The stated recommendation reduces the addressed 
problem and increases the availability of information regarding lines of credit, 
although not eliminating it. It should therefore be highlighted that the subsample, 
might suffer from selection bias in that only those reporting information on the use of 
lines of credit are included. Whether such (potential) bias is size dependent, linked to 
financial health or determined by any other firm characteristic is difficult to further 
examine. In addition, it would have been interesting to incorporate whether the lines 
of credit are committed or uncommitted. This would have enabled a further discussion 
regarding the contingency in the lines of credit as discussed in 2.3.6, as well as to 
what extent lines of credit constitutes true cash equivalents. However due to the lack 
of information in the annual reports this is unfortunately not possible, whereby the 
total undrawn amount under the lines of credit are included in this study. 
 
Further, according to IAS 17 (§8), bank overdrafts that are repayable on demand are 
in some countries incorporated in firm’s cash management and may be included as a 
component of cash and cash equivalents. This increases the risk of potentially double 
counting overdrafts that are already included in cash and cash equivalents on the 
balance sheet, thus inflating the measure of total liquidity. However, since IAS 17 
also requires firms to disclose information of the components included in cash and 
cash equivalents (IAS, §45), potential problems of double counting have been 
minimized by also checking the definition and the associated note of cash and cash 
equivalents in each annual report, adjusting the measure accordingly when necessary. 
An alternative solution would have been to exclude bank overdrafts from the measure 
of total liquidity. However this would neither have yielded a complete measurement 
of total liquidity, nor enabled an analysis of the effect of seasonality on liquid 
holdings, since overdrafts typically have a maturity of less than a year and are used to 
manage short-term fluctuations in cash flows (Holmes, Sugden & Gee, 2005). 
 
Lastly, it is worth commenting on the assumption made that cash, total liquidity and 
the liquidity ratio, is a linear function of the included independent variables. Although 
most previous studies have investigated and found support for a linear relationship 
(e.g. Bates. et al., 2009; Campello et al., 2011; Deloof, 2001; Opler et al., 1999; Sufi, 
2009), it is not possible to rule out non-linearity. For example, Drobetz and Gruninger 
(2007) find a non-linear relationship between leverage and liquidity, and between 
managerial ownership and cash holdings. Guney et al. (2006) also find that there 
exists a significant non-linear relationship between cash and leverage. It would have 
been interesting to further investigate the non-linearity in the relationship between the 
measures of liquidity and the independent variables used in this study, however it is 
unfortunately outside the time scope of this thesis. 
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 4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Before presenting and analyzing the results from the three sets of regressions 
respectively, descriptive statistics of the total sample as well as the subsample are 
presented and analyzed. It is important to first analyze the descriptive statistics of the 
respective samples, in order to enable a more complete discussion and conclusion of 
liquid holdings within Swedish listed firms 2007-2011. 
 
4.1.1 Total Sample – Cash Holdings 2007-2011 
4.1.1.1 Description of Variables 
Table 4.1 presents the statistics of the variables of the total sample 2007-2011. The 
median Swedish firm holds 6.8% of its net assets in cash. The result can be compared 
with those of previous studies, e.g. Opler et al. (1999) find that the median cash to net 
assets ratio for US firms is 6.5%, and Dittmar et al. (2003) find that the overall 
median cash to net assets ratio is 6.6% on their sample covering 45 countries. Drobetz 
and Gruninger (2007) find that Swiss firms hold approximate twice as much, 12,9% 
of net assets, while Ferreira and Vilela (2004) find that the median EMU country’s 
cash to net asset ratio is 9.1%. Based on these numbers, the results of this study is 
more similar to the results found on the US market and on international samples, than 
the results found on the European market. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that the numbers are derived from samples of different time periods. 
 
Table 4.1 - Description of Variables for the Total Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mean of the cash ratio yields significantly larger values. Such difference between 
mean and median is consistent with the results of previous studies (see e.g. Ferreira 
Variable Mean
 1st Quartile 
(25th 
Percentile)
Median
3rd Quartile 
(75th 
Percentile)
Standard 
deviation
Number of 
observations
CASH 0.1133 0.0361 0.0679 0.1316 0.1381 567
M/B 1.6925 1.0199 1.3525 1.8257 1.4742 567
SIZE 7.9754 6.6030 7.4680 9.2494 1.9387 567
OP CF 0.0803 0.0408 0.0875 0.1363 0.1290 567
NWC 0.0666 -0.0392 0.0657 0.1628 0.1580 567
CAPEX 0.0336 0.0123 0.0245 0.0476 0.0292 567
LEV 0.2118 0.0883 0.1907 0.3210 0.1509 567
R&D 0.0999 0.0158 0.0534 0.1179 0.1385 567
ZSCORE 1.8264 0.9500 1.4349 2.2454 1.4799 567
LT DEBT 0.6172 0.3788 0.6932 0.8943 0.3204 567
CF VOL 0.2233 0.0460 0.0668 0.1268 0.7235 567
SEASON 0.0488 0.0171 0.0287 0.0487 0.2513 567
Descriptive statistics on variables for the total sample of Swedish listed firms 2007-2011, used in regression 1.1.
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and Vilela, 2004; Opler et al. 1999). In order to enable comparison between this study 
and previous studies that either use median or mean values, both measurements will 
be used in this chapter. As shown in table 4.1 the average cash to net asset ratio is 
11.3% across the total sample. 
 
Table 4.2 describes the variables separated into yearly values. Looking at median 
values of the cash variable, presented in brackets, one can identify that firms hold less 
cash in 2011 than in 2007, and that the most distinct change is the decrease from 8.9% 
in 2009 to 5.1% in 2010. The same trend applies to the mean values where the cash 
ratio decreased from 12.45% in 2009 to 9.88% in 2010, and is also lower 2011 than 
2007. 
 
Table 4.2 - Averages (medians within parenthesis) of Variables for the Total Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Song and Lee (2012), who study corporate cash holdings in Asian firms before, 
during, and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 find that the median cash 
ratio was at a stable level before the crisis, but that it significantly increased during 
and after the crisis. The results of Table 4.2 indicate a similar increasing pattern 
during the financial crisis 2008 to 2009. However, there is a significantly decreasing 
pattern in 2010, before returning to lower, not higher, levels as before the crisis, 
suggesting that Swedish firms were not able to retain its pre-crisis cash levels. 
Whether the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate cash holdings is long-
term, is difficult to say given the close proximity and remains to be seen. 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.1261 0.1112 0.1245 0.0988 0.1038
(0.0675) (0.0699) (0.0893) (0.0512) (0.0602)
2.0993 1.2370 1.6438 1.8900 1.5740
(1.5379) (1.0291) (1.3551) (1.5297) (1.3380)
7.8158 7.9822 7.9121 8.0145 8.1995
(7.4333) (7.4822) (7.3459) (7.5610) (7.8474)
0.0770 0.0655 0.1020 0.0846 0.0705
(0.0820) (0.0807) (0.1036) (0.0877) (0.0834)
0.0695 0.0629 0.0610 0.0664 0.0745
(0.0434) (0.0698) (0.0585) (0.0653) (0.0829)
0.0398 0.0362 0.0291 0.0306 0.0316
(0.0322) (0.0267) (0.0232) (0.0210) (0.0223)
0.2186 0.2300 0.2074 0.2041 0.1960
(0.1802) (0.2292) (0.2062) (0.1984) (0.1796)
0.0876 0.1034 0.1019 0.1048 0.1030
(0.0435) (0.0507) (0.0512) (0.0553) (0.0627)
1.9002 1.5108 1.9271 1.9006 1.9033
(1.5856) (1.0839) (1.4108) (1.5186) (1.5628)
0.6145 0.6040 0.6339 0.6172 0.6159
(0.6757) (0.6719) (0.7169) (0.6785) (0.7008)
0.3340 0.2542 0.2166 0.1752 0.1110
(0.0739) (0.0724) (0.0665) (0.0614) (0.0646)
0.0416 0.0936 0.0360 0.0346 0.0359
(0.0292) (0.0320) (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.0265)
firms 2007-2011, used in regression 1.1.
Mean values (median within parenthesis) of variables per year for the total sample of Swedish listed
CF VOL
SEASON
CAPEX
LEV
R&D
ZSCORE
LT DEBT
NWC
CASH
M/B
SIZE
OP CF
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4.1.1.2 Average Cash Holdings by Firm Size Quartile 
Based on the results of previous studies, this study takes a closer look at two variables 
that are suggested to play an important role in corporate liquidity management, firm 
size and cash flow volatility (see e.g. Bates et al., 2009; Opler et al., 1999; Sufi, 
2009). This is done by graphically examining the variables relationship with cash 
levels. Figure 4.1 illustrate average cash holdings in the total sample, by firm size 
quartile.  
 
Figure 4.1 - Average Cash Holdings of Total Sample by Firm Size Quartile  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 suggests that smaller firms hold more cash than larger firms, which is 
consistent with the transaction cost motive and precautionary motive indicating that 
smaller firms face higher cost of financing, but inconsistent with the financing 
hierarchy view that larger firms accumulate more cash and also inconsistent with the 
theory on agency costs of managerial discretion. Interestingly, it seems like that the 
largest firms did not suffer from the same decline in cash levels during the studied 
(crisis) period as the other firms. The largest firms instead increased their cash 
holding 2008-2010, in line with the evidence of Song and Lee (2012) that firms build 
up cash holdings during and after a financial crisis. 
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4.1.1.3 Average Cash Holdings by Cash Flow Volatility Quartile 
 
Figure 4.2 below illustrate average cash holdings for quartiles sorted by cash flow 
volatility. 
 
Figure 4.2 - Average Cash Holdings of Total Sample by Cash Flow Volatility Quartile  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The result indicates a significant difference between the fourth quartile’s cash level 
compared to the other three quartiles. Firms with the highest cash flow volatility hold 
(roughly 15%) more cash than the two lower quartiles, which is in line with the 
predictions of both the transaction cost motive and the precautionary motive as the 
risk of liquid asset shortage increases with cash flow volatility. The fourth quartile 
also experienced the most distinct changes in cash levels over the period, with more 
pronounced increases and decreases compared to the other quartiles, indicating that 
the financial crisis affected cash holdings of these firms to a greater extent. 
  
4.1.2 Subsample – Total Liquidity 2007 and 2011 
4.1.2.1 Descriptions of Variables 
Table 4.3 shows the statistics of the variables of the subsample. The results are in 
general in line with the ones of the full sample. The median cash to net assets on the 
subsample is 6.0%, and the mean value is 10.4%. This indicates that the 
characteristics of the subsample do not differ significantly from the full sample, which 
facilitates a comparison of the results from the different sets of regressions. The table 
also presents statistics on the lines of credits, suggesting that the median firm hold 
lines of credit equal to 11.2% of its net assets. The result is in line with the prediction 
that lines of credit accounts for a substantial portion of firms’ total liquidity, and in 
fact represents the majority as in the study of Lins et al. (2010). Lines of credit to cash 
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and lines of credit indicate that the portion of undrawn lines of credit represents 
64.5% of total liquidity for the median firm. In turn, total liquidity of the median firm 
equals as much as 19.8% of net assets. 
 
 
Table 4.3 - Description of Variables for the Subsample 
 
 
Further, the results indicate that Swedish firms hold a larger portion of their total 
liquidity in lines of credit compared to those firms covered in previous studies. For 
example Sufi (2009) finds that the median firm in his US sample holds 45.5% of total 
liquidity in unused lines of credit. The mean values of both this study and of Sufi 
(2009) are somewhat lower than the median values, indicating that there are 
observations in the lower range of the ratio that affects the average downwards.  
 
Table 4.4 below, presents the differences in the statistical values between the two 
years of 2007 and 2011. As previously highlighted, the median cash level is 
somewhat lower in 2011 than it was in 2007. The same applies for the median 
undrawn portion of lines of credit, which decreased from 11.81% of net assets in 2007 
to 10.58% in 2011, indicating that Swedish firms suffered from a decline in total 
liquidity after the financial crisis. The portion of lines of credit in firms’ total liquidity 
did however increase from 62.77% to 65.31%. In other words, the decline in cash 
holdings was greater than the decline in lines of credit resulting in Swedish firms 
relying on lines of credit to a greater extent in 2011 than they did in 2007.  
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean
 1st Quartile 
(25th 
Percentile)
Median
3rd Quartile 
(75th 
Percentile)
Standard 
deviation
Number of 
observations
CASH 0.1043 0.0327 0.0600 0.1128 0.1428 197
LOC 0.1375 0.0611 0.1115 0.1848 0.1064 197
LOC/CASH+LOC 0.5963 0.4153 0.6449 0.8021 0.2605 197
LIQUIDITY 0.2434 0.1280 0.1977 0.3094 0.1837 197
M/B 1.8672 1.0949 1.4223 2.1350 1.8488 197
SIZE 8.1129 6.6392 7.6966 9.3707 1.9037 197
OP CF 0.0727 0.0362 0.0783 0.1191 0.1387 197
NWC 0.0698 -0.0344 0.0641 0.1525 0.1496 197
CAPEX 0.0351 0.0142 0.0251 0.0492 0.0274 197
LEV 0.2151 0.0947 0.1843 0.3239 0.1495 197
R&D 0.0853 0.0134 0.0538 0.1123 0.1031 197
ZSCORE 1.8152 1.0271 1.5689 2.2486 1.3031 197
LT DEBT 0.6062 0.3851 0.6790 0.8838 0.3171 197
CF VOL 0.2194 0.0449 0.0681 0.1151 0.8219 197
SEASON 0.0365 0.0173 0.0275 0.0420 0.0347 197
and 3.1.
Descriptive statistics on variables for the subsample of Swedish listed firms 2007 & 2011, used in regressions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3
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Table 4.4 - Averages (medians within parenthesis) of Variables for the Subsample 
 
 
4.1.2.2 Average Total Liquidity by Firm Size Quartile 
As with the total sample, it is interesting to take a closer look at the level of liquidity 
for firms in the subsample, during 2007 and 2011. Looking at the left diagram below 
in figure 4.3, it can be seen that smaller firms hold slightly more liquidity 2007 than 
larger firms, consistent with cash levels in 2007 in figure 4.1. This is again in line 
with the predictions of the transaction cost motive and the precautionary motive, but 
inconsistent with the financing hierarchy theory and the theory of agency costs of 
managerial discretion. Further, looking at the liquid holdings in 2011, larger firms 
were not as affected by the crisis as the smaller firms. The first and second quartile’s 
liquid holdings decreased significantly compared to 2007, the third quartile’s liquid 
holdings decreased slightly, while the fourth quartile’s liquid holdings actually 
increased (marginally) compared to 2007. 
 
Figure 4.3 - Average Total Liquidity and Portion of Lines of Credit of Subsample by Firm Size 
Quartile 
   
  
Looking at the right hand diagram in figure 4.3, showing the portion of lines of credit 
to total liquidity, there is a clear trend during both 2007 and 2011 that larger firms 
hold significantly more lines of credit compared to smaller firms. This is in line with 
the theory that larger firms benefit more from the advantages of external financing, 
Variable 2007 2011 Total Variable 2007 2011 Total
0.1124 0.0951 0.1043 0.0702 0.0693 0.0698
(0.0637) (0.0504) (0.0600) (0.0375) (0.0718) (0.0641)
0.1443 0.1298 0.1375 0.0376 0.0323 0.0351
(0.1181) (0.1058) (0.1115) (0.0319) (0.0223) (0.0251)
0.5955 0.5971 0.5963 0.2265 0.2021 0.2151
(0.6277) (0.6531) (0.6449) (0.1843) (0.1874) (0.1843)
0.2567 0.2282 0.2434 0.0753 0.0967 0.0853
(0.2030) (0.1951) (0.1977) (0.0475) (0.0627) (0.0538)
2.1043 1.5966 1.8672 0.6090 0.6029 0.6062
(1.4811) (1.3394) (1.4223) (0.6573) (0.6960) (0.6790)
7.9773 8.2677 8.1129 0.3156 0.1095 0.2194
(7.4813) (7.8567) (7.6966) (0.0727) (0.0599) (0.0681)
0.0783 0.0663 0.0727 0.0384 0.0342 0.0365
(0.0813) (0.0765) (0.0783) (0.0287) (0.0257) (0.0275)
regressions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1. ZSCORE has been removed from the regressions in line with discussion in 4.2.1.
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CAPEX
LT DEBT
CF VOL
SEASON
CASH
LOC
LIQUIDITY
LOC/CASH+LOC
M/B
Mean values (median within parenthesis) of variables per year and in total for the subsample of Swedish listed firms 2007 & 2011, used in
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and clearly contradicts the view that larger firms are more prone to cash hoarding, as 
a result of larger room for managerial discretion due to shareholder dispersion and 
thus less monitoring. The two upper quartiles have increased the portion of lines of 
credit compared to cash from 2007 to 2011, and is clearly the major part of liquid 
holdings both years, around 65-70%. Although the portion of lines of credit is quite a 
bit smaller for the two lower quartiles, it still constitutes a substantial portion of total 
liquidity, around 40-55%, again indicating the importance of including lines of credit 
in the study of corporate liquidity. 
 
4.1.2.3 Average Total Liquidity by Cash Flow Volatility Quartile 
The left hand diagram in figure 4.4 below shows that firms in the fourth quartile, with 
largest cash flow volatility, hold more liquidity in accordance with the precautionary 
motive and the transaction cost motive. Just as in the figure 4.2 on cash holdings, it 
can be seen that the firms with the highest cash flow volatility hold significantly more 
liquidity in relation to the other quartiles. The level of liquid holdings does not differ 
substantially between the other three quartiles, although all three quartiles decreased 
liquid holdings from 2007 to 2011. This indicates that the impact of cash flow 
volatility on total liquidity could be somewhat exponential, where firms with high 
cash flow volatility hold significantly more liquidity compared to those in the middle 
and lower range (Q1-Q3), where there is no clear difference. 
 
Figure 4.4 - Average Total Liquidity and Portion of Lines of Credit of Subsample by Cash Flow   
 Volatility Quartile  
 
 
The diagram on the right hand side in figure 4.4 clearly portrays a negative 
relationship between cash flow volatility and the use of lines of credit within firms’ 
liquidity management, in line with hypothesized outcome. The portion varies between 
the first and fourth quartile, amounting to roughly 70% and 40% of total liquidity 
respectively. It is only in the fourth quartile that cash represents a larger portion than 
lines of credit, around 55-60%. 
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4.2 Regression Results  
4.2.1 Diagnostic Testing for the Regression Assumptions 
All six assumptions of the multiple linear regression model, presented in section 3.4, 
have been analyzed. The first assumption requires the regression to be linear in the 
parameters, which is true for all the regressions in this study, and that the regression 
model is correctly specified, which means that irrelevant variables should be 
excluded. When testing for redundant variables, the inclusion of the probability of 
default variable (ZSCORE) had a large impact on the other variables’ statistical 
significance in regression 1.1. Although the variable in it self yielded statistically 
significant impact on cash, the variable seems to be affected by the previously 
discussed problems of circularity, which cause statistical noise ultimately affecting 
the overall validity of the regression. The ZSCORE variable was thus removed form 
regression 1.1 and also in the following regressions on the subsample (for regression 
results including ZSCORE, please see Appendix D). All other variables were when 
testing considered relevant in the regression models.  
 
To control for the assumption of non-stochastic independent variables and non-linear 
relationship between the independent variables, correlation matrices are constructed 
for all regressions. Although no single measure of multicollinearity exists, this study 
applied a rule of thumb that correlations between the independent variables should be 
below 0.8 to assume that no exact collinearity exists. The results suggest that the 
independent variables are non-stochastic, and show no presence of exact collinearity. 
However, the probability of default variable again yields results that deviate from the 
otherwise similar results. The correlation between this variable and the market-to-
book ratio and leverage variable (0.5171 and -0.6730 respectively) is significantly 
larger than the correlation between the other variables (correlation matrices of the 
independent variables are presented in Appendix C).  
 
As discussed in section 3.4.1, the Hausman test and the Fixed Effects Redundant 
Likelihood Ratio test can control whether random or fixed effects are necessary when 
conducting regressions on a panel data set. The null hypothesis in the Hausman test 
was rejected indicating that the random effects model is misspecified and should not 
be used. In the redundancy test, the null hypothesis that fixed effects in both 
dimensions are redundant, i.e. both cross-sectional and over time, was rejected which 
indicate that there is unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed effects in both dimensions were 
therefore employed in the first set of regressions. The test results of the Hausman test 
and the Fixed Effects Redundant Likelihood test are reported in Appendix E. 
 
The assumption of homoscedasticity was however not fulfilled and the error terms 
were heteroscedastic in all three sets. White heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
was therefore employed diagonally on the first regression set while the standard errors 
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in the second and third set were adjusted with the HAC (Newey-West) estimator (due 
to additional presence of autocorrelation as discussed below).  
 
In the panel data set the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that there was no problem 
of autocorrelation, but in the second and third set of regressions the same statistic 
indicated that there was some correlation between the error terms (although typically 
associated with time-series). The HAC (Newey-West) estimator treats both the 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem in the second and third regression sets. 
  
4.2.2 Results from the First Regression Set – Determinants of Cash 
Holdings 
Table 4.5 presents the results of regression 1.1 conducted on the panel data set 
covering 2007-2011, reporting coefficients together with White standard errors in 
parentheses. The level of statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated by *, 
** and *** representing the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The p-value of the F-
statistic (0.0000) rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero, which 
confirms that the independent variables explain the behavior of the dependent 
variable. The adjusted R2, which adjusts for additional variables included that do not 
add to the explanatory power of the regression model, further indicates that there is a 
high “goodness of fit” in the model (0.8544), and thus the regression line fits the joint 
data points well.  
 
Table 4.5 - Results of Regression 1.1 on Total Sample 
 
 
 
Regression results Regression results
Regression (1.1) Regression (1.1) 
Dependent variable CASH
Intercept -0.3591** LEV -0.1081**
(0.1672) (0.0440)
M/B 0.0299*** LTDEBT 0.0542***
(0.0062) (0.0192)
SIZE 0.0483** R&D -0.0401
(0.0204) (0.0513)
OP CF 0.2601*** CF VOL 0.0410
(0.0499) (0.0355)
NWC -0.1825** SEASON 0.0023
(0.0819) (0.0041)
CAPEX 0.2230 DIV 0.0067
(0.2159) (0.0087)
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
R2 0.8999
Adj. R2 0.8544
N 567
coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
The table presents coefficients of the least square panel data regression on cash holdings within Swedish listed firms
2007-2011. The standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity using Whites (diagonal), and are reported in brackets.
ZSCORE and industry dummy variables have been excluded as of seperate discussion. *, ** and *** indicate that the
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Growth Opportunities 
The market-to-book coefficient indicates that growth opportunities affect cash 
holdings positively as predicted by hypothesis 1a. The result supports the transaction 
cost motive, which suggest that firms with growth opportunities face greater cost of 
cash shortage and therefore hold more cash as a buffer compared to other firms. The 
result is also in line with the predictions of the precautionary motive, suggesting that 
growth firms hold cash for precautionary reasons to avoid external capital markets, 
since high information asymmetries associated with growth opportunities make 
external financing expensive. As such, it is also in line with the financing hierarchy 
theory that postulates that firms with larger information asymmetries follow a pecking 
order behavior. The positive coefficient of growth opportunities is in line with the 
results of most previous studies discussed in this paper, e.g, Bates et al. (2009) on the 
US market, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) on EMU countries, Kim et al. (1998) on the US 
market, Opler et al. (1999) also on the US market, and Ozkan & Ozkan 2004 on the 
UK market. 
 
Firm Size 
The size coefficient is statistically significant and positive, supporting hypothesis 2b 
but contradicting hypothesis 2a. The result supports the financing hierarchy view 
suggesting that larger firms hold more cash because they have been able to 
accumulate cash over time. Another explanation is put forward by the theory of 
agency costs of managerial discretion, which suggests that large firms hold more cash 
because they tend to have larger shareholder dispersion that give discretionary power 
to managers. Interestingly, out of the studies that are relevant to compare with, none 
find that size and cash holdings are positively correlated, but that they are negatively 
correlated which rather supports the trade-off theory (see e.g. Deloof, 2001; Drobetz 
& Gruninger 2007; Ferreira & Vilela 2004; Opler et al. 1999). Although the 
coefficient in table 4.5 is statistically significant and positive, it is worth noticing that 
when analyzing firm size and cash holdings graphically in the descriptive statistics, it 
is shown that firms in the lowest quartile do hold more cash than the other quartiles, 
indicating that the relationship might not be completely straightforward.  
 
Cash Generation 
The coefficient of operating cash flow is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
reports a positive relationship between cash generation and cash holdings, which is in 
line with the predictions of hypothesis 3a but contradicts hypothesis 3b. The result is 
inconsistent with the findings of e.g. Bates et al. (2009) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), 
but consistent with most other previous studies discussed (e.g. Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). The result again 
supports the financing hierarchy view, suggesting that firms with strong cash 
generation invest relatively more in liquid assets compared to firms with weaker cash 
generation.  
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Working Capital Intensity/ Liquid Asset Substitution 
In line with the predicted outcome in hypothesis 4, indicates the NWC coefficient a 
negative relationship between liquid asset substitution and cash holdings. The 
relationship is explained by the transaction cost motive, which suggests that the need 
of cash reserves decreases with the amount of assets available that cost-efficiently can 
be converted into cash. The result is in line with previous studies that have included 
liquid asset substitution proxies in their analysis (e.g. Bates et al., 2009; Dittmar et al., 
2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). 
 
Investment Intensity 
The capital expenditures coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. Hence, 
no reliable evidence on investment intensity’s impact on cash holdings can be found. 
Opler et al. (1999) also find a positive however significant relationship, whereas 
Bates et al. (2009) find statistical significant results of a negative relationship between 
investment intensity and cash holdings. The variable’s impact on cash holding thus 
remains ambiguous and unknown on the Swedish market. Since the variable is not 
commonly included in previous studies, it is difficult to compare the lack of 
significance within the model. However, one potential explanation could be the 
relatively low level of capital expenditures within Swedish firms. Opler et al. (1999) 
find that the median (average) firm’s capital expenditures amounts to 0.064 (0.090) of 
total assets on the US market, while the corresponding capital expenditures to net 
assets is 0.025 (0.034) on the Swedish market. The ratio on the Swedish market would 
have been even lower if measured to total assets in line with Opler et al. (1999), 
indicating a clear difference between the two markets.  
 
Leverage 
The negative leverage coefficient, statistically significant at the 5% level, supports 
hypothesis 6a but rejects hypothesis 6b. The result is once again in line with the 
financing hierarchy model, which states that cash and leverage should follow an 
inverse pattern. However, the result is consistent with the trade-off model as well. The 
agency cost theory of managerial discretion suggests that firms with low leverage are 
less subject to monitoring and therefore have greater opportunities to hoard cash to 
pursue investments of their own objective. Further, the transaction cost motive 
suggest that cost of investing in liquid assets increases with leverage, and that highly 
levered firms hold relatively less cash for this reason. The result confirms previous 
findings of e.g. Deloof (2001), Drobetz and Gruninger (2007), Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), suggesting that leverage is a strong determinant 
of level of corporate cash.  
 
Debt Maturity Structure 
The debt maturity structure coefficient is statistically significant and positive, which 
contradicts hypothesis 7. The result is at odds with the theoretical prediction that 
firms with shorter debt maturity structure hold more cash for precautionary reasons in 
order to avoid the financial distress they would face if their loans were not renewed at 
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maturity. It is further also contradicting the theoretical aspect that firms with higher 
information asymmetries have more short-term debt, and therefore hold more cash to 
reduce dependence on external capital. There is unfortunately no clear theoretical 
explanation behind the positive relationship. 
 
R&D Intensity 
The empirical results of R&D’s impact on corporate cash in previous studies are 
ambiguous, Drobetz and Gruninger (2007) cannot find support for a relationship 
between R&D intensity and cash holdings, while Bates et al. (2009) and Opler et al. 
(1999) find support for a positive relationship. No statistically significant result of 
R&D’s impact on cash holding in Swedish firms can be found in this study. There is 
thus no evidence that R&D intensive firms hold more cash than other firms because 
they face greater costs of external financing, due to information asymmetries and low 
asset tangibility. There is neither any evidence that R&D intensive firms consume its 
internal surplus to a greater extent than other firms, and therefore hold less cash.  
 
Cash Flow Volatility 
The cash flow volatility variable is insignificant and no conclusion on whether firms 
with higher cash flow volatility hold more cash can be drawn. However, when 
analyzing the cash flow volatility graphically in section 4.1.1.3, a clear difference in 
the amount of cash held by the fourth quartile with the highest cash flow volatility and 
the three other quartiles was identified, indicating that the variable indeed affects 
corporate cash holdings, although the impact cannot be statistically proven. Cash flow 
volatility has in many other studies proven to be an important determinant of 
corporate cash levels, e.g. Bates et al. (2009) conclude that the increase in corporate 
cash holdings among US firms can to large extent be explained by the increase in cash 
flow volatility.   
 
Seasonality 
Similar to the cash flow volatility variable, does the seasonality variable not yield any 
significant result. Hence, no conclusions on the impact of intra-year cash fluctuations 
on corporate cash holdings can be drawn. A further discussion on the effect of 
seasonality within Swedish firms liquidity management is conducted in the analysis of 
regression 2.1 (see 4.2.3.1). 
 
Dividends  
Finally, no evidence on the role of dividend payments on cash levels is found. 
Empirical results of previous studies are ambiguous where some studies (e.g. Bates et 
al., 2009) find support for a negative relationship, while others (e.g. Ozkan & Ozkan, 
2004) find no support that dividend policies have a significant influence on corporate 
liquidity. The theoretical predictions that dividend-paying firms should hold relatively 
less cash because dividends reduces the amount of internally generated funds, as 
suggested by the financing hierarchy model, or because dividend-paying firms can 
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simply cut dividends in case of cash shortage, as suggested by the transaction cost 
motive, does not seem to apply for the firms included in this study.  
 
Industry Classification 
In a separate regression industry dummy variables were included to capture potential 
variations across industries. However several problems arises when adding the 
dummy variables, including autocorrelation and impaired goodness of fit, ultimately 
affecting the validity of the model. The relatively small sample does not yield a 
significant number of observations within each industry classification (as specified 
previously), which makes it difficult to draw statistical conclusions on industry 
association’s impact on cash holdings. Further, it is difficult to comprehend which 
factors these dummy variables capture, that are not already incorporated with the 
relatively extensive set of independent variables included in this study. Industry 
dummy variables have, hence, been excluded in the above regression. For regression 
including industry dummy variables, please see Appendix D. 
 
4.2.3 Results for the Second Regression Set – Determinants of Total 
Liquidity and the Relationship Between Lines of Credit and Cash 
As discussed previously, the second set of regressions is carried out on a subsample 
consisting of observations from 2007 and 2011 solely. When comparing the results of 
the first and second set of regressions it is therefore important to bear in mind that the 
regression results are derived from two non-identical samples.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the second set of regressions on the subsample of firms 
incorporating the use of (undrawn) lines of credit within firms’ liquidity management. 
The two years of 2007 and 2011 are separated using both intercept and slope dummy 
variables. In all three regressions the null hypothesis of the F-test that all coefficients 
are equal to zero is rejected, which suggest that the independent variables do explain 
the level of total liquidity of the firms included in the subsample. Although not as 
strong as in regression 1.1, the adjusted R2 in regression 2.1 (0.4971) indicate that the 
model has an acceptable degree of linear approximation of the observations. 
Comparing across previous studies, the adjusted R2 in this regression is in the upper 
range (see e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Sufi, 2009). The adjusted R2 in 
regression 2.2 and 2.3 is 0.5743 and 0.2526 respectively. Although the adjusted R2 in 
regression 2.3 is lower, it is still higher than many comparable studies on the use of 
lines of credit (see e.g. Sufi, 2009; Campello et al., 2011), and thus still considered in 
the upper range. 
 
The left hand side of table 4.6 reports the regression coefficients (and standard errors 
within parenthesis) using 2007 as a reference year. On the right hand side the same 
regression is reported with 2011 as a reference year. The dummy variables in the 
lower half of the table test the significant difference between the two years. The slope 
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dummy variables test the difference in effect of the control variables on the dependent 
variable 2007 and 2011, while the intercept dummy variable tests shifts in the mean of 
the dependent variable between the two years, holding the independent variables 
constant. Since the intercept dummy does not yield significant results in any of the 
regressions, no significant difference in the mean of the dependent variables 2007 and 
2011 can be concluded. The respective slope dummy variables are commented on 
further in the analysis of each of the independent variables below. 
 
4.2.3.1 Determinants of Total Liquidity – Regression 2.1 
Growth Opportunities 
The results suggest that the level of growth opportunities affect the amount of total 
liquidity held by Swedish firms positively, confirming hypothesis 1a. When 
comparing the two years no significant difference on the variable’s impact on total 
liquidity can be identified (the dummy variables are insignificant), indicating that the 
financial crisis did not have any significant affect on growth firms’ level of liquidity. 
The positive relationship is in line with the predictions of the transaction cost motive, 
i.e. that growth firms hold more cash because they face greater cost of cash shortage 
as they have to give up valuable growth opportunities. It is further in line with the 
precautionary motive, i.e. that growth firms face greater information asymmetries, 
which makes external funding expensive and liquidity reserves valuable. As such, the 
result is not inconsistent with the financing hierarchy model either, which suggests 
that information asymmetries cause firms to follow a pecking order behavior in their 
financing where cash constitutes the most favorable source. A firm facing relatively 
large information asymmetries would hence find liquid holdings more valuable. In 
addition, as mentioned in section 2.2.2 are firms with strong cash flows commonly 
also characterized with high market-to-book ratios. This would further explain why 
growth firms hold more total liquidity when following the arguments of the financing 
hierarchy model, i.e. that such firm can invest relatively more in liquid asset holdings. 
The result is similar to the result of regression 1.1 and supports hypothesis 1a, 
indicating the impact of growth opportunities does not change whether corporate 
liquidity is defined as cash or cash plus pre-negotiated liquidity (lines of credit).  
 
Firm Size 
The positive size coefficient is statistically insignificant in 2007 but significant in 
2011. There is however a statistically significant difference between the two years 
indicating that the positive relationship was stronger in 2011 than in 2007. The 
positive relationship supports hypothesis 2b and is in line with the findings of 
regression 1.1. The increased impact of firm size on total liquidity is also visible in 
the descriptive statistics 4.1.2.2 where there is a more clear increase in total liquidity 
moving from the lowest to the highest quartile in 2011 compared to 2007. The 
positive relationship is in line with the predictions that large firms have been 
profitable historically and have been able to accumulate more cash over time.  
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Table 4.6 - Results of Regressions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 on Subsample 
 
 
Regression results - reference category 2007
Regression (2.1) Regression (2.2) Regression (2.3) Regression (2.1) Regression (2.2) Regression (2.3)
Dependent variable LIQUIDITY CASH LOC/LOC+CASH Dependent variable LIQUIDITY CASH LOC/LOC+CASH
Intercept -0.0104 -0.0538 0.4306*** Intercept -0.0820 -0.0419 0.2342
(0.0741) (0.0340) (0.1312) (0.0708) (0.0629) (0.1508)
LOC - -0.0319 - LOC - -0.1265 -
- (0.1061) - - (0.0905) -
M/B 0.0297*** 0.0161*** 0.0065 M/B 0.0359*** 0.0346*** -0.0366
(0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0098) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0263)
SIZE 0.0044 0.0061 -0.0042 SIZE 0.0264*** 0.0126 0.0305*
(0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0156) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0179)
OP CF 0.4095*** 0.3176*** -0.1973 OP CF -0.0355 -0.1557 0.1935
(0.1290) (0.0740) (0.2021) (0.1206) (0.0995) (0.1899)
NWC -0.2369** -0.1154 0.0842 NWC -0.0704 -0.0943 0.5655***
(0.1031) (0.0841) (0.1515) (0.0983) (0.0869) (0.1782)
CAPEX 0.5681 0.0986 1.2239 CAPEX -0.3120 -0.2031 1.3916
(0.6099) (0.5353) (0.8781) (0.5577) (0.3302) (0.8901)
LEV -0.2292** -0.2445*** 0.5817*** LEV -0.3333*** -0.3265*** 0.5646***
(0.0980) (0.0880) (0.1759) (0.0997) (0.0922) (0.1888)
LTDEBT 0.1552*** 0.0878* -0.0297 LTDEBT 0.1253*** 0.0913*** -0.1089
(0.0546) (0.0479) (0.0719) (0.0461) (0.0326) (0.0925)
R&D 0.2453 0.3605*** -0.3259 R&D -0.0698 0.0381 0.2400
(0.1704) (0.1302) (0.2781) (0.1297) (0.1077) (0.2325)
CF VOL -0.0067 0.0081 -0.0447*** CF VOL 0.0812 0.1072* -0.1060
(0.0086) (0.0066) (0.0154) (0.0532) (0.0558) (0.0786)
SEASON 1.6212*** 1.4284*** -0.5921 SEASON 1.6585*** 1.2127** -0.5895
(0.4924) (0.3524) (0.8345) (0.5701) (0.4730) (0.9009)
DIV 0.0175 -0.0216 0.1425*** DIV -0.0203 -0.0381 0.0413
(0.0297) (0.0255) (0.0496) (0.0406) (0.0382) (0.0787)
LOC*D2011 - -0.0943 - LOC*D2007 - 0.0947 -
- (0.1365) - - (0.1364) -
M/B*D2011 0.0059 0.0181 -0.0443* M/B*D2007 -0.0062 -0.0185 0.0431
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0261) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0261)
SIZE*D2011 0.0218** 0.0062 0.0336* SIZE*D2007 -0.0221** -0.0065 -0.0347*
(0.0094) (0.0083) (0.0183) (0.0094) (0.0084) (0.0185)
OP CF*D2011 -0.4441** -0.4722*** 0.3944 OP CF*D2007 0.4450** 0.4733*** -0.3907
(0.1763) (0.1222) (0.2738) (0.1761) (0.1221) (0.2729)
NWC*D2011 0.1638 0.018 0.4706** NWC*D2007 -0.1665 -0.0212 -0.4812**
(0.1206) (0.0925) (0.2078) (0.1213) (0.0934) (0.2094)
CAPEX*D2011 -0.8837 -0.306 0.1533 CAPEX*D2007 0.8801 0.3017 -0.1676
(0.8221) (0.6034) (1.1536) (0.8226) (0.6041) (1.1511)
LEV*D2011 -0.1034 -0.0813 -0.0146 LEV*D2007 0.1040 0.0820 0.0171
(0.1241) (0.1075) (0.2187) (0.1243) (0.1075) (0.2194)
LTDEBT*2011 -0.0292 0.0042 -0.0767 LTDEBT*2007 0.0299 -0.0035 0.0792
(0.0694) (0.0595) (0.1126) (0.0695) (0.0597) (0.1129)
R&D*D2011 -0.3163 -0.3237* 0.5614 R&D*D2007 0.3152 0.3224* -0.5660
(0.2283) (0.1774) (0.3529) (0.2282) (0.1771) (0.3533)
CF VOL*D2011 0.0874 0.0984* -0.0636 CF VOL*D2007 -0.0879* -0.0991* 0.0613
(0.0529) (0.0556) (0.0822) (0.0530) (0.0557) (0.0827)
SEASON*D2011 0.0477 -0.2037 0.0436 SEASON*D2007 -0.0373 0.2157 -0.0026
(0.7084) (0.5555) (1.1561) (0.7121) (0.5598) (1.1624)
DIV*D2011 -0.0367 -0.0153 -0.0969 DIV*D2007 0.0378 0.0165 0.1012
(0.0454) (0.0373) (0.0876) (0.0460) (0.0378) (0.0882)
D2011 -0.0697 0.0141 -0.1889 D2007 0.0716 -0.0119 0.1964
(0.0989) (0.0673) (0.1795) (0.0990) (0.0672) (0.1802)
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
R2 0.556145 0.628614 0.340293 R2 0.556145 0.628614 0.340293
Adj. R2 0.497136 0.574317 0.252587 Adj. R2 0.497136 0.574317 0.252587
N 197 197 197 N 197 197 197
Regression results - reference category 2011
The table presents coefficients of the least square cross-sectional regressions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of Swedish listed firms 2007 and 2011. The left-hand side of the table presents
regression results with 2007 as reference category for the included year dummy variable, while the right-hand side of the table presents regression results with 2011 as
reference category for the year dummy variable. The standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using HAC (Newey-West), and are reported in
brackets. ZSCORE has been excluded as of previous discusson presented in the panel data regression. Due to the small sample within regressions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, industry
dummy variables have been excluded all together. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Following the idea of the financing hierarchy one would expect such firm to have 
invested relatively more in liquid asset reserves. Also the agency cost of managerial 
discretion theory provides an explanation to the positive relationship, suggesting that 
larger firms have larger shareholder dispersion and more room for opportunistic cash 
hoarding. No support can however be found that economies of scale and the relatively 
higher cost of external financing cause smaller firms to hold more total liquidity 
compared to larger firms, as suggested by the transaction cost motive and 
precautionary motive. However, as depicted in the descriptive statistics, there is an 
indication that total liquidity, to some extent, in fact decreases with firm size in 2007, 
but this relationship is not statistically significant in this regression.  
 
Cash Generation 
The positive coefficient of operating cash flow in 2007 (0.4095) supports hypothesis 
3a and the financing hierarchy view of corporate liquidity, which suggests that firms 
with strong internal cash generation can invest relatively more in liquid assets. The 
result is in line with the result of regression 1.1, but looking at the dummy variables in 
regression 2.1 for the two respective years, there is an indication that the relationship 
between cash generation and total liquidity has changed in 2011. Although not 
statistically significant individually in 2011, the slope dummy variables suggests that 
there is a statistically significant difference (-0.4441) between 2007 and 2011 
indicating a negative relationship between cash generation and total liquidity in 2011. 
This relationship would instead support the transaction cost motive which puts 
forward that firms with week internal cash generation have higher probability of 
liquid asset shortage, shifting the curve in figure 2.1 outwards and ultimately 
increasing the optimal level of liquid assets post-crisis. All in all, the effect that 
internal cash generation has on Swedish firms’ total liquidity is somewhat ambiguous, 
but a significant change in the variable’s impact over the studied crisis period is 
identified. 
 
Working Capital Intensity/ Liquid Asset Substitution 
The working capital coefficient is statistically significant in 2007 and confirms the 
hypothesis that the amount of assets available that a firm cost-effectively can convert 
into cash affects total liquidity negatively. The result supports hypothesis 4 and is in 
line with the result in regression 1.1, thus no difference on the impact of liquid asset 
substitution when including pre-negotiated liquidity in the measure of corporate 
liquidity can be identified. The coefficient is however not significant in 2011, and 
none of the slope dummy variables are significant. Whether substitution between 
liquid assets and cash can explain total liquidity levels also in 2011 is thus less 
obvious.  
 
Investment Intensity 
No evidence that the level of capital expenditures is a determinant of total liquidity 
can be found. Similar results was found in regression 1.1, indicating that the variable 
have little impact on corporate liquidity management among Swedish firms. The 
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variable acts as a differentiator between the trade-off theory and the financing 
hierarchy theory, as the two models predict opposite impacts of level of investments 
on corporate liquidity. The trade-off theory highlights the cost of cash shortage that an 
investment intensive firm would face if cash flow is unexpectedly low, and hence 
such firms would value liquid asset reserves higher. The financing hierarchy model, 
on the other hand, highlights investment outlays’ negative effect on the amount of 
internally generated surplus available to build up liquid asset reserves. Surprisingly, 
none of the theories’ predictions conform to the results of this study regarding 
investment intensity’s impact on corporate liquidity.  
 
Leverage 
In regression 1.1 it was evident that leverage and cash holdings are negatively related 
and the results of regression 2.1 suggests that the same relationship applies for 
leverage and total liquidity, again supporting hypothesis 6a. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the impact of leverage on total liquidity 2007 and 
2011. The financing hierarchy’s prediction that when investments exceed internally 
generated funds, debt increases, and when internally generated funds exceed 
investments, debt decreases seems to be equally true both pre- and post-crisis.  
 
Debt Maturity Structure 
Also the debt maturity variable is in line with the results of regression 1.1, suggesting 
that firms with longer debt maturities not only hold relatively more cash but relatively 
more total liquidity as well. The result contradicts hypothesis 7 and is at odds with the 
theoretical predictions of the trade-off theory, which suggests that the refinancing risk 
associated with short-term debt cause firms with shorter debt maturity structure to 
hold cash for precautionary reasons. It was further suggested that such firms would 
face higher transaction costs, again indicating relatively larger cash reserves. The 
explanation behind the positive relationship between portion of long-term debt and 
total liquidity does unfortunately not become any clearer in this regression, and 
remains unknown.  
 
R&D Intensity 
The trade-off theory suggests that R&D intensive firms face relatively higher cost of 
external financing due to the intangible and opaque nature of its asset structure. R&D 
intensive firms are in addition suggested to face relatively high costs of financial 
distress, all in all speaking for such firms holding relatively more liquid assets. On the 
other hand, financing hierarchy suggests that R&D intensive firms, all else equal, 
consume more of its internally generated surplus, and hence hold relatively less 
liquidity.  The results of this study do not support any of the above-mentioned 
predictions, and no evidence that R&D intensity is a determinant of Swedish 
corporate liquidity can be found. The same result was found in regression 1.1, and 
there is thus no difference in the conclusion of the relationship between R&D 
intensity and cash, and R&D intensity and total liquidity.  
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Cash Flow Volatility 
The results of regression 1.1 found no evidence on cash flow volatility’s impact on 
cash holdings, but the results of regression 2.1 yield some indication on a relationship 
between the two variables. Although not statistically significant separately, the slope 
dummy variable of cash flow volatility suggests that 2007 is statistically significantly 
different from 2011. One should interpret the result with caution, but the result 
indicates that the impact of cash flow volatility on total liquidity was lower in 2007 
than it was 2011. This implies that the precautionary need of liquidity holdings for 
volatile firms is stronger post-crisis on the Swedish market.   
 
Seasonality 
The seasonality variable shows both strong positive statistical and economical 
significance in regression 2.1, which is inconsistent with the findings of regression 
1.1. This suggests that the level of seasonality has no impact on the level of cash 
holdings, but significantly impacts the level of total liquidity. The seasonality 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level and supports hypothesis 11 suggesting that 
firms with relatively large intra-year fluctuations hold relatively more liquidity for 
precautionary reasons to minimize the risk of liquidity shortage. The results highlight 
the issue that conclusions made on corporate cash holdings (when excluding pre-
negotiated lines of credit) may not be representative for corporate liquidity 
management as a whole. However, in contrast to cash flow volatility, there is no 
significant change of the variable’s impact pre- and post-crisis, indicating that there is 
no increased (or decreased) need for precautionary cash post-crisis to cover for intra-
year fluctuations.  
 
Dividends 
Whether the firm pays dividends or not does not seem to affect its total liquidity. As 
previously mentioned, the empirical support for dividends as a determinant of 
corporate liquidity is somewhat ambiguous. The variable’s impact on corporate 
liquidity could be investigated further on a larger sample, and perhaps using absolute 
numbers rather than a dummy variable (following e.g. Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004), before 
making any final conclusions.  
 
4.2.3.2 The Relationship Between Cash and Lines of Credit – Regressions 2.2 and 
2.3  
Regression 2.2 and 2.3 further investigate the relationship between lines of credit and 
cash within Swedish listed firms’ liquidity management 2007 and 2011. As described 
in 3.3.1, regression 2.2 investigates whether cash and lines of credit are substitutes or 
complements, by including undrawn lines of credit (LOC) as one of the independent 
variables. Table 4.6 shows no statistically significant relationship between the two 
sources of liquidity. Although not possible to conclude how lines of credit relate to 
cash within the subsample as a whole due to lack of significant results, the sign of the 
coefficient can provide an indication as to the true relationship. The coefficient from 
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lines of credit is consistently negative both 2007 (-0.0319) and 2011 (-0.1265) 
indicating that the relationship is substitutionary rather than complementary. It is 
important to emphasize that this is only an indication of the true relationship, and as 
mentioned it is not possible to draw any further statistical conclusions. 
 
By analyzing the results of regression 2.3, it is however possible to further investigate 
the relationship between lines of credit and cash by studying the determinants of the 
proportionality of lines of credit (or cash) within firms’ total liquid holdings (lines of 
credit and cash).  
 
Growth Opportunities 
As previously argued in section 2.3, the use of lines of credit can be both negatively 
and positively related to growth opportunities. From the results in table 4.6, it is not 
possible to establish a relationship between the market-to-book ratio and the portion 
of lines of credit in any of the two years. The market-to book ratio therefore does not 
explicitly determine the use of lines of credit as opposed to cash within firms’ 
liquidity management, although the variable has been proven to significantly 
determine the level of both cash in regression 1.1 and the level of total liquidity in 
regression 2.1 positively. Further, Sufi (2009) finds a negative significant relationship 
between growth opportunities and the portion of lines of credit in his US sample. This 
is in line with hypothesis A1, following the idea that firms with high market-to-book 
ratios face larger information asymmetries and therefore hold less debt in general, but 
cannot be proven to be true also on the Swedish market. 
 
However, one interesting finding is that there is a significant negative difference in 
the relationship of the market-to-book variable between 2007 and 2011 on the 10% 
level. The coefficient of the dummy variable included in the regression with 2007 as 
reference year (-0.0443), thus indicates that a firm with equal growth opportunities 
both years, would use relatively less portion of lines of credit post-crisis 2011 
compared to 2007.  
 
Firm Size 
Size is shown to have a significant positive determining effect on the portion of lines 
of credit within Swedish firms’ liquid holdings 2011 on a 10% level, but no such 
relationship can be concluded in 2007. The result of 2011 year’s coefficient is in line 
with hypothesis B1 that larger firms are expected to benefit more from external 
financing than smaller firms. The positive affect of size on portion of lines of credit is 
also supported by findings on the US market (Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009). The descriptive 
statistics, portraying portion of lines of credit by size quartiles also show a clear 
pattern that larger firms hold more lines of credit as opposed to cash, however the 
pattern is clear both 2007 and 2011. Although such evidence is not supported in the 
regression results for 2007, there is a significant difference between the two years in 
both directions, a positive difference 2007 to 2011 and a negative difference 2011 to 
2007. This clearly indicates that there is a weaker determining effect of size on the 
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use of lines of credit as opposed to cash pre-crisis in 2007, and that the use of lines of 
credit is more size dependent (positively) post-crisis. 
 
Cash Generation 
Although cash generation has been proven to have a positive significant effect on cash 
holdings in regression 1.1, and by e.g. Dittmar et al. (2003), Kim et al. (1998), Opler 
et al. (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004), as well as a positive effect on total 
liquidity in 2007 (regression 2.1), no such relationship can be found to affect the 
portion of lines of credit compared to cash. There is neither any significant difference 
in the effect of cash generation on portion of lines of credit pre- and post-crisis. Thus 
there is no statistical support for hypothesis C of a positive relationship, contrary to 
Sufi (2009) and Campello et al. (2011) who find that cash generation affects lines of 
credit positively. 
 
Working Capital / Borrowing Base 
Since accounts receivable and inventory commonly constitute collateral for lines of 
credit, hypothesis D predicts a positive relationship between the net working capital 
variable and the portion of lines of credit. The relationship is significantly positive (on 
a 1% level) post-crisis in 2011, but cannot be significantly determined pre-crisis 2007. 
The difference between both years is however also significant, negatively from 2011 
to 2007 and positively 2007 to 2011. This suggests that the borrowing base played a 
larger determining factor in the use of lines of credit post-crisis compared to pre-
crisis. This could be a factor of for example stricter requirements of collateral from 
external lenders post-crisis, or that firms with a larger borrowing base are granted 
more favorable terms and thus are more prone to use lines of credit as opposed to 
cash. 
 
Investment Intensity 
Although the coefficient indicates a strongly positive impact on the use of lines of 
credit, investment intensity has no significant effect on the use of lines of credit as 
opposed to cash within firms’ liquidity management. The variable is not significant in 
any of the other regressions either, indicating no specific impact of capital 
expenditures on Swedish firms liquidity management. Further, since there are not 
many studies who investigate the use of lines of credit, and even fewer that consider 
investment intensity as a determinant, it is difficult to assess the absence of a 
significant relationship further. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage has a strongly significant (1% level) positive impact on Swedish firms’ use 
of lines of credit as opposed to cash within their liquidity management. This 
relationship is in line with hypothesis E and indicates that less levered firms prefer to 
rely on cash to a greater extent in order to avoid monitoring from creditors. The 
leverage variable is the only variable that significantly affects the portion of lines of 
credit both years. The affect of leverage on lines of credit is almost equally large 2007 
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(0.5817) and 2011 (0.5646), which is also shown in the lack of significant differences 
between the two years. It can thus be concluded that leverage is one of the factors that 
impact Swedish firms’ use of lines of credit irrespective of year.  
 
Debt maturity and R&D Intensity 
Neither debt maturity nor R&D intensity has any significant determining effects on 
the use of lines of credit 2007 or 2011. Further, there is no significant difference 
between the two years. Although debt maturity has shown to have highly significant 
positive determining affect on cash holdings (1% level) in regression 1.1, as well as 
on total liquidity both years (1% level) in regression 2.1, the proportional use of lines 
of credit remains unaffected by debt maturity. 
 
Cash Flow Volatility 
In line with hypothesis H1, cash flow volatility is a negatively significant determinant 
of the portion of lines of credit 2007, while no conclusion can be drawn when looking 
at 2011 or differences between the two years. This could be explained by the 
theoretical motivation that firms with larger variability in cash flows are less prone to 
use lines of credit due to less favorable (often cash flow based) covenants, as 
presented by Sufi (2009). Although neither Sufi (2009) nor Yun (2009) find any 
statistically significant relationship, the coefficients are generally negative on the US 
market, as are the coefficients in this study during both years. The lack of statistically 
significant result in 2011 indicates that cash flow volatility cannot be concluded to 
determine the use of lines of credit 2011. However, looking at the descriptive 
statistics in 4.1.2.3, the downward trend of cash flow volatility on the use of lines of 
credit is clear in 2007 as well as in 2011 (figure 4.4), indicating that the relationship is 
not entirely straightforward. 
 
Seasonality 
The effect of seasonality on cash holdings in regression 1.1 cannot be determined, at 
the same time as seasonality strongly determines total liquidity positively in 
regression 2.1 (1% level). It is therefore somewhat unexpected that seasonality is no 
determining factor in the proportionality between lines of credit and cash. The lack of 
statistically significant findings is in line with those on the US market (Sufi, 2009), 
although the coefficient is negative both years, contradicting the positive relationship 
indicated on the US sample as well as hypothesis I2. Since seasonality has not 
commonly been included in previous studies, and is also measured somewhat 
differently compared to Sufi (2009), it is difficult to draw any conclusions without 
further testing. 
 
Dividends 
The dividend dummy variable has not shown any significant determining factor in 
any of the previous regressions. However, in 2007 dividend-paying firms hold more 
lines of credit than cash, indicated by the highly significant positive coefficient (1% 
level). This is contrary to the predictions of hypothesis J that covenants incorporated 
 63 
in the agreements of lines of credit would limit the amount of dividends paid out to 
shareholders, thus resulting in a negative relationship. One can only speculate why 
dividend-paying firms hold more lines of credit in 2007, without a more thorough 
look at the dividend-paying variable within the model. It could however be that the 
covenants were much more favorable pre-crisis, not restricting payouts to 
shareholders to the extent that was first predicted. Another possibility is that Swedish 
firms were in a generally healthy state in 2007 and therefore complied with the 
existing covenants, allowing dividend payouts. 
 
4.2.4 The Third Regression Set – Liquidity Ratio 
The third set of regressions was conducted as an attempt to investigate whether the 
definition commonly used by practitioners yielded a stronger explanatory power as to 
the determinants of corporate liquidity. The liquidity ratio incorporates present as well 
as future liquidity sources and uses in the measure, as presented in 3.3.1. Since this 
measure has not, to the knowledge of the authors, been used in any previous studies, it 
is difficult to compare the findings of the regression to previous findings. The 
regression model can however be interpreted and analyzed in comparison to 
regression model 2.1 of total liquidity, as to how the different definition of liquidity, 
the liquidity ratio, affects the success of the model in predicting the dependent 
variable, as well as to the explanatory power of the independent variables within the 
model. 
 
Looking at the adjusted R2 value of 0.1805 in regression 3.1, it is considerably lower 
compared to the adjusted R2 of 0.4967 in regression 2.1, suggesting a significantly 
weaker “goodness of fit”, though the number of observations is the same across the 
two samples. Further, the model in regression 3.1 is more vulnerable to the number of 
independent variables included, in order to compare differences across the two years. 
This is shown by the larger difference between the R2 and the adjusted R2, which 
indicates that there are relatively more variables included that do not add to the 
explanatory power of the regression model. The difference between the R2 and the 
adjusted R2 is 0.1070 in regression 3.1, almost twice as large as in regression 2.1 
where it is 0.0594. Attempts on excluding certain independent variables where made, 
however no substantial improvements with regards to the R2 values were obtained. 
Studying the F-statistic (0.0002), there are also indications of a weaker rejection of 
the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients are zero, although the difference 
when compared to all of the other regression sets (0.0000) is only very slight. The 
regression results for regression 3.1 are reported in Appendix F.  
 
Although it is not possible to rule out the liquidity ratio as a more viable definition of 
firms’ liquidity with the above discussion, the model as specified in regression set 3.1 
does neither indicate a better goodness of fit, nor stronger explanatory power of the 
independent variables on the level of liquidity in this study. Further evaluation of the 
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model in regression 3.1 is needed, preferably using a larger sample, in order to avoid 
drawing incorrect conclusions regarding determinants of liquid holdings of Swedish 
firms 2007 and 2011, defined using the liquidity ratio. The regression model is thus 
not analyzed further in this study. 
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 5  Concluding Remarks 
This study has as a first step studied the determinants of cash holdings within Swedish 
listed firms 2007-2011. As a second step this study has incorporated lines of credit to 
the measure of cash and investigated the determinants of total liquidity on a 
subsample 2007 and 2011, as well as examining the relationship between lines of 
credit and cash within Swedish firms liquidity management. The time period was 
chosen in order to incorporate an analysis of the results before and after the recent 
financial crisis. Lastly, an alternative measurement of liquidity commonly used by 
practitioners was included as an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice.  
 
The median Swedish firm is found to hold 6.8% of net assets in cash throughout the 
period 2007-2011, comparable to previous findings on the US market, however lower 
than findings on the European market. The cash levels have further decreased slightly 
post-crisis 2011 compared to pre-crisis 2007, contradicting previous results on 
corporate cash holdings subsequent of financially constrained times. The long-term 
effect on the Swedish market is however yet to be seen. 
 
Further, this study finds that total liquidity amounts to 19.8% of net assets, and that 
undrawn lines of credit constitute a substantial portion of Swedish firms’ liquidity 
management. Lines of credit amount to a total of 11.2% of net assets, and as much as 
64.5% of total liquidity, significantly larger than findings on the US market. Lines of 
credit are thus clearly the major part of Swedish listed firms’ liquidity, suggesting in 
line with previous findings that this form of pre-negotiated liquidity should not be 
overlooked within corporate liquidity literature. Comparing between the two years, 
this study also finds that the decrease in lines of credit is smaller than the decrease in 
cash 2007 to 2011, proving that Swedish firms rely more on lines of credit post-crisis 
compared to pre-crisis. 
 
Although lines of credit constitute the majority of Swedish firms liquid holdings, this 
study does not find any larger differences in the determinants of cash holdings and the 
determinants of total liquidity on the Swedish market. This indicates that lines of 
credit are used as an important liquidity component, however lines of credit are not 
completely different from that of cash with regards to the underlying determinants. 
The result however shows that that growth opportunities, firm size and cash 
generation positively determine the level total liquidity, while leverage is a negative 
determinant. This is in line with the financing hierarchy theory that predicts that firms 
with more growth opportunities are exposed to larger information asymmetries and 
will rely on internal funds before external capital. Further the financing hierarchy 
theory postulates that larger firms and firms with stronger cash flows accumulate 
more liquidity over time, and are able to invest more in liquid assets compared to 
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other firms, or alternatively choose pay down its debt explaining the negative 
relationship with leverage.  
 
However, the findings are also partially explained by the transaction cost motive 
arguing that the cost of liquid shortage is larger for firms with larger growth 
opportunities who will hold more liquidity, and that more levered firms will face 
higher cost of investing in liquid assets and thus hold less liquidity. Additional 
support for the transaction cost motive is found through the negative impact of liquid 
asset substitution on total liquidity, since the need for liquid reserves decreases with 
the amount of assets available that cost-efficiently can be converted into cash. The 
only support for the precautionary motive is found through the positive determinant of 
growth opportunities on liquidity, explained by the larger information asymmetries 
that make external capital more expensive, in line with the financing hierarchy theory. 
Also the theory on agency costs of managerial discretion is supported through the 
positive effect of size and the negative effect of leverage on liquid holdings. Debt 
maturity has a positive impact on total liquidity, contradicting prediction of both the 
transaction cost motive and the precautionary motive. However, this study finds no 
support that investment intensity, R&D intensity, cash flow volatility or dividends 
determine the level of total liquidity within Swedish listed firms. 
 
Lastly, the measure of seasonality yields no determining impact on Swedish firms’ 
cash holdings 2007-2011, however clearly determines total liquidity both 2007 and 
2011. The positive relationship is in line with both the precautionary motive and the 
transaction cost motive, that seasonal firms hold more liquidity in order to minimize 
the risk of cash shortage and avoid external capital markets. This clearly highlights 
the importance of not drawing conclusions on cash holdings solely, since such 
conclusion may not be representative for corporate liquidity holdings as a whole. All 
in all, the results conclude that both the trade-off model and the financing hierarchy 
model play important roles in explaining the determinants of liquid holdings within 
Swedish listed firms, although none of the theories fully explain these determinants. 
 
In addition to the above results this study finds significant differences pre- and post-
crisis. Firm size has a stronger positive impact on total liquidity 2011 compared to 
2007 implying that size has a stronger determining factor on liquidity post-crisis. At 
the same time cash generation has a stronger negative impact on total liquidity 2011, 
clearly indicating that a firm with equal levels of cash generation both years, hold less 
liquidity post-crisis compared to pre-crisis. 
 
Although no conclusion can be drawn whether lines of credit and cash are used as 
substitutes or complements within Swedish listed firms liquidity management, this 
study finds several determinants behind the proportionality of lines of credit and cash 
in total liquidity. Leverage has an equally large positive determining effect on the use 
of lines of credits as opposed to cash both 2007 and 2011, indicating that less levered 
firms prefer to rely on cash to a greater extent in order to avoid monitoring from 
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creditors. No evidence that cash generation, investment intensity, debt maturity, R&D 
intensity or seasonality affect the proportionality of lines of credit within total 
liquidity is found. The absence of support for seasonality’s effect on lines of credit is 
unexpected due to its strong positive impact on total liquidity. However size, 
borrowing base and cash flow volatility turn out to be important determinants during 
the studied period. Size and borrowing base are found to have a larger positive effect 
2011, indicating that the use of lines of credit is more dependent on size and that the 
borrowing base plays a larger role post-crisis compared to pre-crisis. Cash flow 
volatility affects lines of credit negatively in 2007, although strong indications of a 
negative relationship are found 2011 as well. Lastly, this study finds a positive 
relationship between dividend-payments and the proportionality of lines of credit. 
This last result is unexpected and not equivalent to any previous findings, requiring 
further research to be conducted with regards to dividends impact on lines of credit. 
 
The alternative measurement of liquidity, the liquidity ratio, did not yield a stronger 
explanatory power of determinants of corporate liquidity within Swedish listed firms. 
Although this study is not able to draw any conclusions as to whether the liquidity 
ratio is a more just definition of total liquidity, the aim at bridging the gap between 
theory and practice was not achieved. 
 
5.1 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study aimed at highlighting the drawbacks in previous liquidity management 
studies, which most commonly exclude lines of credit as a component of total 
liquidity. The findings in this paper conclude that lines of credit constitute the 
majority of Swedish firms’ total liquidity. However there is much that needs to be 
investigated further in future coming studies on liquidity management. The remainder 
of this section outlines a few suggestions, which the authors wish to emphasize.  
 
Firstly, for a more comprehensive analysis of the role of lines of credit in corporate 
liquidity management, future research may investigate some of the determinants 
highlighted in this study in greater detail. For example, this study has not been able to 
investigate any potential non-linear relationships or whether cash and lines of credit 
are used as a source of finance for different purposes (e.g., day-to-day transactions, 
hedge against cash shortfalls, funding acquisitions etc.). This study has neither been 
able to capture the effect of total liquidity on market performance. 
 
Secondly, future research could incorporate more detailed characteristics of the lines 
of credit. This study has only been able to look at undrawn portions of the total lines 
of credit, but further analysis could be made with regards to drawdowns. In addition, 
this study was not able to make a distinction between committed and uncommitted 
lines of credit. In order to further analyze to what extent lines of credit substitute for 
cash, such differentiation should be sought.  
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However, in order for this to be examined quantitatively, several improvements 
regarding the reporting of lines of credit are required. Due to the proven importance 
of lines of credit within corporate liquidity management, will improved information 
regarding this source of financing be of interest to investors, credit rating agencies, 
creditors, as well as other stakeholders. The authors would thus lastly like to 
emphasize the importance of improved reporting standards that seek more detailed 
disclosure.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: List of Companies  
 
Table 6.1 – List of companies in full sample and subsample 
Companies in total sample (2007-2011)   Companies in subsample (2007 & 2011) 
A-COM AB   AARHUSKARLSHAMN AB 
AARHUSKARLSHAMN AB   ACADEMEDIA AB 
ACADEMEDIA AB   ACANDO AB 
ACANDO AB   ACAP INVEST AB 
ACAP INVEST AB   A-COM AB 
ADDNODE GROUP AB   ADDNODE GROUP AB 
ADDTECH AB   ADDTECH AB 
AF AB   AF AB 
ALFA LAVAL AB   ALFA LAVAL AB 
ALLENEX AB   ANOTO GROUP AB 
ALLTELE ALLMAENNA SVENSKA TELE   ASSA ABLOY AB 
ANOTO GROUP AB   ATLAS COPCO AB 
ASSA ABLOY AB   AXFOOD AB 
ATLAS COPCO AB   AXIS COMMUNICATIONS AB 
AXFOOD AB   BALLINGSLOV INTERNATIONAL AB 
AXIS COMMUNICATIONS AB   BE GROUP AB 
BALLINGSLOV INTERNATIONAL AB   BEIJER ALMA AB 
BE GROUP AB   BEIJER ELECTRONICS AB 
BEIJER ALMA AB   BERGS TIMBER AB 
BEIJER ELECTRONICS AB   BILLERUDKORSNAS AB 
BERGS TIMBER AB   BIOPHAUSIA AB 
BILIA AB   BOLIDEN AB 
BILLERUDKORSNAS AB   BONG LJUNGDAHL AB 
BIOLIN SCIENTIFIC AB   BRIO AB 
BIOPHAUSIA AB   BYGGMAX GROUP AB 
BIOTAGE AB   CARL LAMM AB 
BOLIDEN AB   CASHGUARD AB 
BONG LJUNGDAHL AB   CISION AB 
BRIO AB   CLAS OHLSON AB 
BROSTROM AB   CLOETTA AB 
BYGGMAX GROUP AB   CONSILIUM AB 
CARL LAMM AB   CTT SYSTEMS AB 
CASHGUARD AB   CYBERCOM GROUP AB 
CISION AB   DGC ONE AB 
CLAS OHLSON AB   DIN BOSTAD AB 
CLOETTA AB   DORO AB 
CONNECTA AB   DUNI AB 
CONSILIUM AB   DUROC AB 
CTT SYSTEMS AB   ELECTROLUX AB 
CYBERCOM GROUP AB   ELEKTA AB 
DGC ONE AB   ENIRO AB 
DIN BOSTAD AB   ERICSSON LM 
DORO AB   FEELGOOD SVENSKA AB 
DUNI AB   FENIX OUTDOOR AB 
DUROC AB   GETINGE AB 
ELECTROLUX AB   GEVEKO AB 
ELEKTA AB   GLOBAL HEALTH PARTNER AB 
ELEKTRONIKGRUPPEN BK AB   GUNNEBO AB 
ELOS AB   GUNNEBO INDUSTRIER AB 
ENIRO AB   HAKON INVEST AB 
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ERICSSON LM   HALDEX AB 
FAGERHULT AB   HEMTEX AB 
FEELGOOD SVENSKA AB   HEXPOL AB 
FENIX OUTDOOR AB   HIQ INTERNATIONAL AB 
GETINGE AB   HL DISPLAY AB 
GEVEKO AB   HMS NETWORKS AB 
GLOBAL HEALTH PARTNER AB   HOGANAS AB 
GUNNEBO AB   HOLMEN AB 
GUNNEBO INDUSTRIER AB   HUSQVARNA AB 
HAKON INVEST AB   IAR SYSTEMS GROUP AB 
HALDEX AB   IBS AB 
HEMTEX AB   INDUST & FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
HEXPOL AB   INDUTRADE AB 
HIFAB GROUP AB   INTELLECTA AB 
HIQ INTERNATIONAL AB   ITAB SHOP CONCEPT AB 
HL DISPLAY AB   KAPPAHL AB 
HMS NETWORKS AB   KNOW IT AB 
HOGANAS AB   LAGERCRANTZ GROUP AB 
HOLMEN AB   LAMMHULTS DESIGN GROUP AB 
HUSQVARNA AB   LINDAB INTERNATIONAL AB 
IAR SYSTEMS GROUP AB   MALMBERGS ELEKTRISKA AB 
IBS AB   MEDA AB 
INDUST & FINANCIAL SYSTEM   MEDIVIR AB 
INDUTRADE AB   MEKONOMEN AB 
INTELLECTA AB   MICRONIC MYDATA AB 
ITAB SHOP CONCEPT AB   MIDSONA AB 
JEEVES INFORMATION SYSTEMS   MODERN TIMES GROUP 
KABE HUSVAGNAR AB   MUNTERS AB 
KAPPAHL AB   NCC AB 
KNOW IT AB   NEDERMAN HOLDING AB 
LAGERCRANTZ GROUP AB   NET INSIGHT AB 
LAMMHULTS DESIGN GROUP AB   NETONNET AB 
LINDAB INTERNATIONAL AB   NEW WAVE GROUP AB 
MALMBERGS ELEKTRISKA AB   NIBE INDUSTRIER AB 
MEDA AB   NOBIA AB 
MEDIVIR AB   NOLATO AB 
MEKONOMEN AB   NOTE AB 
MICRONIC MYDATA AB   OEM INTERNATIONAL AB 
MIDSONA AB   OPCON AB 
MODERN TIMES GROUP   ORTIVUS AB 
MSC KONSULT AB   PARTNERTECH AB 
MULTIQ INTERNATIONAL AB   PEAB AB 
MUNTERS AB   POOLIA AB 
NCC AB   PRECISE BIOMETRICS AB 
NEDERMAN HOLDING AB   PREVAS AB 
NET INSIGHT AB   PROACT IT GROUP AB 
NETONNET AB   PROFFICE AB 
NEW WAVE GROUP AB   PROFILGRUPPEN AB 
NIBE INDUSTRIER AB   READSOFT AB 
NILORNGRUPPEN AB   REJLERKONCERNEN AB 
NISCAYAH GROUP AB   RORVIK TIMBER AB 
NOBIA AB   ROTTNEROS AB 
NOLATO AB   SAAB AB 
NORDIC SERVICE PARTNERS HLDG   SANDVIK AB 
NOTE AB   SAS AB 
NOVOTEK AB   SCANIA AB 
OEM INTERNATIONAL AB   SECO TOOLS AB 
OPCON AB   SECTRA AB 
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OREXO AB   SECURITAS AB 
ORTIVUS AB   SEMCON AB 
PARTNERTECH AB   SIGMA AB 
PEAB AB   SKANSKA AB 
POOLIA AB   SKF AB 
PRECISE BIOMETRICS AB   SSAB AB 
PREVAS AB   SWECO AB 
PRICER AB   SWEDISH MATCH AB 
PROACT IT GROUP AB   SWEDOL AB 
PROFFICE AB   SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB 
PROFILGRUPPEN AB   SYSTEMAIR AB 
Q-MED AB   TELE2 AB 
READSOFT AB   TELECA AB 
REJLERKONCERNEN AB   TELELOGIC AB 
RORVIK TIMBER AB   TELIASONERA AB 
ROTTNEROS AB   TELIGENT AB 
SAAB AB   HIFAB GROUP AB 
SANDVIK AB   TICKET TRAVEL GROUP AB 
SAS AB   TRELLEBORG AB 
SCANIA AB   VBG GROUP AB 
SECO TOOLS AB   VENUE RETAIL GROUP AB 
SECTRA AB   VITROLIFE AB 
SECURITAS AB   VOLVO AB 
SECURITAS DIRECT AB   XANO INDUSTRI AB 
SEMCON AB   ZODIAK TELEVISION AB 
SENSYS TRAFFIC AB     
SIGMA AB     
SKANSKA AB     
SKF AB     
SKISTAR AB     
SSAB AB     
STJARNAFYRKANT AB     
STUDSVIK AB     
SVEDBERGS I DALSTORP AB     
SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB     
SWECO AB     
SWEDISH MATCH AB     
SWEDISH ORPHAN BIOVITRUM AB     
SWEDOL AB     
SYSTEMAIR AB     
TELE2 AB     
TELECA AB     
TELELOGIC AB     
TELIASONERA AB     
TELIGENT AB     
TICKET TRAVEL GROUP AB     
TILGIN     
TRADEDOUBLER     
TRELLEBORG AB     
VBG GROUP AB     
VENUE RETAIL GROUP AB     
VITROLIFE AB     
VOLVO AB     
XANO INDUSTRI AB     
ZODIAK TELEVISION AB     
Total number of firms: 163   Total number of firms: 133 
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Appendix B: Definitions of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Table 6.2 – Definitions of Dependent and Independent Variables with Corresponding Bloomberg Functions (Mnemonics) 
 
 
Variable Short name Definition Bloomberg Functions (Mnemonics)
Cash CASH Cash & Marketable Securities / Net Assets CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Total liquidity LIQUIDITY Cash & Marketable Securities + Undrawn Lines of Credit / Net Assets (CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES + undrawn lines of credit*) / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Liquidity ratio LIQUIDITY RATIO
(Cash & Marketable Securities t + Operating Cash Flow t+1 (if positive) + Net 
Working Capital t+1 (if positive) + Undrawn Lines of Credit t ) / (Capital 
Expenditures t+1 + Operating Cash Flow t+1 (if negative) + Net Working Capital t+1 
(if negative) + Short-term Debt t + Dividends t+1)
(CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES t + CF_CASH_FROM_OPER t+1 (if positive) + 
CF_CHNG_NON_CASH_WORK_CAP t+1 (if positive) + undrawn lines of credit* t) / 
(CF_CASH_FROM_INV_ACT t+1 + CF_CASH_FROM_OPER t+1 (if negative) + 
CF_CHNG_NON_CASH_WORK_CAP t+1 (if negative) + BS_ST_BORROW t + CF_DVD_PAID t+1)
Growth opportunities M/B (BV Total Assets - BV Equity + MV Equity - Cash & Marketable Securities)              / Net Assets
(BS_TOT_ASSET - TOTAL_EQUITY + HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP - 
CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES) / (BS_TOT_ASSET - 
CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Firm size SIZE ln (BV Total Assets) ln (BS_TOT_ASSET)
Cash generation OP CF Operating Cash Flow / Net Assets CF_CASH_FROM_OPER / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Liquid asset substitution NWC Current Assets - Current Liabilities / Net Assets WORKING_CAPITAL / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Investment intensity CAPEX Capital Expenditures / Net Assets CAPITAL_EXPEND / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Leverage LEV Total Debt / Total Assets SHORT_AND_LONG_TERM_DEBT / BS_TOT_ASSET
R&D intensity R&D Intagible Assets - Goodwill / Net Assets (BS_TOT_ASSET - TANGIBLE_ASSETS - BS_GOODWILL)  / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Z-score ZSCORE LN (1.2 × WC/Toal Assets + 1.4 × RE/Total Assets + 3.3 × EBIT/Total Assets + 0.6 × MV Equity/Total Assets + 1.0 × Sales/Total Assets)
LN ((1.2 × WORKING_CAPITAL/BS_TOT_ASSET) + (1.4 × BS_RETAIN_EARN/BS_TOT_ASSET) 
+ (3.3 × EBIT/BS_TOT_ASSET) + (0.6 × HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP/BS_TOT_ASSET) + (1.0 × 
SALES_REV_TURN/BS_TOT_ASSET))
Debt maturity LTDEBT Long-term Debt / Total Debt BS_LT_BORROW / SHORT_AND_LONG_TERM_DEBT
Cash flow volatility CF VOL StDev of previous 10 year Operating Cash Flow / Net Assets StDev 10y rolling CF_CASH_FROM_OPER / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
Seasonality SEASON Yearly StDev of Operating Cash Flow / Net Assets using quarterly data StDev CF_CASH_FROM_OPER / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES) using quarterly data
Lines of credit LOC Undrawn Lines of Credit / Net Assets Undrawn lines of credit* / (BS_TOT_ASSET - CASH_AND_MARKETABLE_SECURITIES)
* Data on lines of credit is collected manually from the annual reports
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Appendix C: Correlation Matrices of Independent Variables 
 
Table 6.3 – Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables of Total Sample, Regression 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 – Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables of Subsample, Regression 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1. 
 
 
 
Subsample M/B SIZE OP CF NWC CAPEX LEV LT DEBT R&D CF VOL SEASON
M/B 1,0000
SIZE -0,1529 1,0000
OP CF 0,2027 0,1655 1,0000
NWC 0,1277 -0,0800 -0,1094 1,0000
CAPEX 0,1214 0,1268 0,1134 0,0934 1,0000
LEV -0,1545 0,2769 -0,1105 0,0094 0,0739 1,0000
LT DEBT 0,1261 0,2205 0,1679 0,2608 0,0791 0,2859 1,0000
R&D 0,2319 -0,1498 -0,0617 -0,2167 -0,1535 0,0140 0,0101 1,0000
CF VOL 0,0911 -0,1320 0,0838 -0,1475 0,1230 0,1084 0,0258 0,0768 1,0000
SEASON 0,3448 -0,4126 -0,2770 -0,0785 0,0614 -0,1380 -0,2167 0,3157 0,1205 1,0000
ZSCORE has been excluded from the regressions as of previously discussed problems with circularity in regression set 1.1.
Correlation matrix of independent variables (excluding dividend dummy) in the subsample used in regression sets 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Note that
Total Sample M/B SIZE OP CF NWC CAPEX LEV LT DEBT ZSCORE R&D CF VOL SEASON
M/B 1.0000
SIZE -0.1180 1.0000
OP CF 0.0784 0.2112 1.0000
NWC 0.1043 -0.0532 0.0012 1.0000
CAPEX 0.0840 0.1760 0.1566 0.0096 1.0000
LEV -0.1668 0.3083 -0.0742 -0.0644 0.1030 1.0000
LT DEBT 0.0304 0.2485 0.1313 0.2241 0.0188 0.2689 1.0000
ZSCORE 0.5171 -0.2413 0.1968 0.1734 0.0588 -0.6730 -0.0690 1.0000
R&D 0.0789 -0.2019 -0.1671 -0.2604 -0.2024 -0.0318 0.0207 0.0332 1.0000
CF VOL 0.0525 -0.1595 -0.0709 -0.1798 0.0733 0.0801 -0.0271 0.1151 -0.0195 1.0000
SEASON 0.0095 -0.0777 -0.0186 -0.0575 -0.0409 -0.0214 0.0022 0.0225 0.0041 0.0067 1.0000
regression as of previously discussed problems with circularity.
Correlation matrix of independent variables (excluding divided dummy) in the total sample used in regression set 1.1. Note that ZSCORE is excluded from the
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Appendix D: Regression Results of Regression 1.1 including Z-score 
and Industry Dummy Variables 
 
 
Table 6.5 – Regression Results of Regression 1.1 Including the Redundant Variable 
ZSCORE and Industry Dummy Variables Respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression (1.1) 
with ZSCORE
Regression (1.1) 
with industry 
dummy variables
Dependent variable CASH CASH
Intercept -0.4033** 0.1318***
(0.1671) (0.0246)
M/B 0.0300*** 0.0452***
(0.0054) (0.0076)
SIZE 0.0463** -0.0051
(0.0202) (0.0032)
OP CF 0.2480*** -0.1375
(0.0467) (0.0863)
NWC -0.2159*** -0.1325***
(0.0798) (0.0336)
CAPEX 0.2012 -0.1635
(0.1978) (0.2081)
LEV 0.0038 -0.3199***
(0.0463) (0.0350)
LTDEBT 0.0561*** 0.0579***
(0.0184) (0.0156)
R&D -0.0383 0.0917*
(0.0504) (0.0481)
ZSCORE 0.0221***
(0.0054)
CF VOL 0.0472 0.0179**
(0.0354) (0.0070)
SEASON 0.0024 0.0101
(0.0040) (0.0151)
DIV 0.0014 0.0001
(0.0082) (0.0115)
ICB1000 -0.0094
(0.0175)
ICB3000 -0.0033
(0.0151)
ICB4000 -0.0134
(0.0132)
ICB5000 -0.0194
(0.0134)
ICB6000 -0.0699**
(0.0224)
ICB9000 -0.0299***
(0.0121)
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000
R2 0.905480 0.472833
Adj. R2 0.862118 0.452520
N 567 567
coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Regression results - first set
The table presents coefficients of the least square panel data regression on cash holdings
within Swedish listed firms 2007-2011. The standard errors are robust for
heteroscedasticity using Whites (diagonal), and are reported in brackets. The regression
inclding ZSCORE is conducted using fixed effects in both dimensions, while the regression
including industry dummy variables is conducted using period fixed effects. Reference
category for the industry dummy variables is ICB2000. ICB7000 dummy variable was
excluded since this category included no companies. *, ** and *** indicate that the
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Appendix E: Fixed Effects Redundancy Test and Hausman Test for 
Random Effects 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 – Redundant Fixed Effects Test for Regression 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 – Hausman Random Effects Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: Reg. 1.1
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 10.860306 -162.389 0.0000
Cross-section Chi-square 968.937897 162 0.0000
Period F 1.715048 -4.389 0.1458
Period Chi-square 9.912154 4 0.0419
Cross-Section/Period F 10.934479 -166.389 0.0000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 983.464816 166 0.0000
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: Reg. 1.1
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 89.761705 11 0.0000
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Appendix F: Regression Results for Regression 3.1 – Liquidity Ratio 
 Table 6.8 – Regression Results for Regression 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression results - 
reference category 2007
Regression results - 
reference category 2011
Regression (3.1) Regression (3.1)
Dependent variable LIQUIDITY RATIO Dependent variable LIQUIDITY RATIO
Intercept 1.9888*** Intercept 1.3996
(0.6612) (0.9463)
M/B -0.1186 M/B -0.3079
(0.1387) (0.1844)
SIZE -0.0848 SIZE 0.1220
(0.0754) (0.0979)
OP CF 1.2857 OP CF -0.5678
(1.5762) (1.2163)
NWC -2.2787** NWC 2.5631
(1.0762) (2.0437)
CAPEX -6.8884 CAPEX -13.1580**
(4.5786) (5.8601)
LEV -2.8389*** LEV -1.7142
(1.0619) (1.7300)
LTDEBT 2.2855*** LTDEBT 1.7410***
(0.4890) (0.6145)
R&D -2.2809* R&D -0.6681
(1.2510) (1.2553)
CF VOL -0.0929 CF VOL 1.5935***
(0.0627) (0.3786)
SEASON 2.6753 SEASON 0.3183
(4.3412) (5.3384)
DIV 0.5563* DIV -0.1976
(0.3348) (0.6559)
M/B*D2011 -0.1893 M/B*D2007 0.1893
(0.1857) (0.1857)
SIZE*D2011 0.2068* SIZE*D2007 -0.2068*
(0.1138) (0.1138)
OP CF*D2011 -1.8535 OP CF*D2007 1.8535
(1.9047) (1.9047)
NWC*D2011 4.8418** NWC*D2007 -4.8418**
(2.0721) (2.0721)
CAPEX*D2011 -6.2696 CAPEX*D2007 6.2696
(7.2538) (7.2538)
LEV*D2011 1.1247 LEV*D2007 -1.1247
(1.8258) (1.8258)
LTDEBT*2011 -0.5445 LTDEBT*2007 0.5445
(0.7371) (0.7371)
R&D*D2011 1.6128 R&D*D2007 -1.6128
(1.6047) (1.6047)
CF VOL*D2011 1.6864*** CF VOL*D2007 -1.6864***
(0.3883) (0.3883)
SEASON*D2011 -2.3570 SEASON*D2007 2.3570
(6.6830) (6.6830)
DIV*D2011 -0.7539 DIV*D2007 0.7539
(0.7598) (0.7598)
D2011 -0.5891 D2007 0.5891
(1.0477) (1.0477)
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000177 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000177
R2 0.287632 R2 0.287632
Adj. R2 0.180545 Adj. R2 0.180545
N 197 N 197
The table presents coefficients of the least square cross-sectional regression 3.1 of Swedish listed firms
2007 and 2011. The left-hand side of the table presents regression results with 2007 as reference
category for the included year dummy variable, while the right-hand side of the table presents
regression results with 2011 as reference category for the year dummy variable. The standard errors
are robust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using HAC (Newey-West), and are reported in
brackets. ZSCORE has been excluded as of previous discusson presented in the panel data regression. 
Due to the small sample within regression 3.1, industry dummy variables have been excluded all
together. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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